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L INTRODUCTION 
The State in its response brief has characterized the dispute as one where a 
decision in favor the Appellants would result in the exclusion of the State from carrying 
out many governmental functions within the Glen Canyon National Recreation Area 
"GCNRA"). Response Brief, pp. 6-7. Instead, the State's obvious objective is to create 
concurrent jurisdictional authority so that it may raise lucrative property tax revenue from 
these Appellants, and the thousands of others like them in the boating Mecca of the West, 
without having an enforceable obligation to provide some respectable level of services 
within the area from which the revenues are extracted. The State seeks the enviable 
position of extracting revenues and then directing the public to look to the federal 
government for services. Thus, the crux of the State's dispute in not to preserve to the 
State the authority to provide governmental services within the GCNRA, but rather to 
create State concurrent jurisdictional authority to raise general tax revenues from within 
the GCNRA that can be used to provide services elsewhere in the State. 
The State of Arizona, as amicus, is weighing in on the side of the Appellee with 
the same argument that the lower court found convincing, namely that the states can 
regulate activities within the GCNRA so long as the states' regulations do not directly 
conflict with the federal regulations. Amicus requires that state regulatory authority 
continue unless Congress makes an explicit statement preempting the states' authority. 
Amicus also believes that a boat registration law that evenhandedly benefits local public 
interests, and is nondiscriminatory, does not offend the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution. 
The Appellants are contesting the authority of the State to concurrently regulate the 
registration of the Appellants' boats by requiring substantial taxes before the Appellants 
can exercise their federal privileges notwithstanding that the boats in question are used 
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exclusively within the boundaries of the federally created, operated and managed GCNRA. 
The Appellants acknowledge that they are already subject to the pervasive regulatory 
authority of the federal agencies responsible for implementing extensive federal laws 
concerning water related recreational activities within GCNRA. To oust the State from 
concurrent jurisdiction, the Appellants need only show that there is an intent by Congress 
to preempt the states from the field of water recreation within the GCNRA. That intent of 
Congress does not have to be explicit. Federal regulations do not need to directly conflict 
with state regulations. Occupation of the field of federal interest does not have to cover 
every minutia to exclude state authority. It is simply enough to show that Congress has 
the constitutional power to preempt the State and that it has used its power broadly 
enough to demonstrate its intent to preempt the State, even where there is no direct 
conflict between the federal and state authorities. 
Finally, the Appellants contest both the authority of the State and the manner 
chosen by the State to position itself as the gatekeeper and admissions ticket taker vis a 
vis the boat owners in the GCNRA so that the State uses its position to extract 
disproportional and burdensome amounts of revenues from these owners as a condition for 
them to use the federal privilege. The revenues collected can be distributed by the State 
taxing authority outside of the GCNRA while the State does not obligate itself to provide 
any perceptible benefits to the users of the federally funded and operated GCNRA. This 
is the type of burden on a federal privilege that is exercised in interstate commerce that is 
prohibited by the Constitution. 
IL CONGRESS HAS IMPLICITLY PREEMPTED STATE AUTHORITY OVER 
WATER RECREATION WITHIN GCNRA 
A. State Boater Registration Law Disturbs Congress' Scheme For the 
National Park System 
Although the Supreme Court has referred to four categories of preemption in 
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almost every one of its recent preemption cases, it is difficult to determine which category 
governs a particular case. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n. 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983)(citations omitted); California 
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S.Ct. 1419, 1425 (1987); International Paper 
Co. v. Ouellette. 107 U.S. 805, 811 (1987); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 
107 S.Ct. 683, 689 (1987). A circuit court summed up the preemption dilemma best in 
Palmer v. Liggett Group. Inc.. 825 F.2d 620, 624 (1st Or. 1987) where it was stated, "The 
different forms of preemption are usually summarized by neat citations to familiar 
Supreme Court authority . . . . we are somewhat wary that these ready citations list, but 
do not define, any real distinction among the various types of preemption . . . ." 
The gist of preemption is whether Congress expressly or impliedly intended to 
displace state law or state law concepts in enacting federal law or federal regulations. 
Under this test the court must determine whether the application of state law disturbs too 
much the congressionally declared scheme. 
Under the Property Clause of the Constitution, Congress exercises power both of a 
proprietor and that of a legislature over the public domain. Congress's power over public 
lands is complete power. The Property Clause must be given expansive reading in that 
the power that the Constitution has given to Congress over public lands is without 
limitation. Kleppe v. New Mexico. 96 S. Ct. 2285, reh'g denied, 97 S. Ct. 189 (1976). 
The public lands of the United States are held, not as an ordinary proprietor, but in trust 
for all the people. It does not matter whether title is acquired by cession, or by treaty, or 
whether the lands are located within states or territories. Congress has the exclusive right 
to control and dispose of them, and no state can interfere with this right or embarrass its 
exercise. Utah Power & Light. 230 F. 328, 336 (1915). 
The State's response contends that the State has general statewide jurisdiction that 
continues until the State either cedes all or a portion of that jurisdiction. In the GCNRA 
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the State asserts that it has never ceded exclusive jurisdiction to the United States. On 
this reed the State proposes to extrapolate sufficient remnants of state jurisdiction to 
regulate boat registration and thereby collect a hefty property tax, notwithstanding the 
pervasive presence of the United States within the GCNRA and the extensive 
governmental regulation and services provided by the federal agencies to boaters and 
recreational users generally there. 
The federal government has not avoided forcefully asserting its regulatory authority 
over the National Park System or the GCNRA. In November 1995, during the 
appropriations dispute between the Congress and the President, the NPS not only closed 
the parks, but it specifically declined to allow the state agencies to reopen and operate the 
parks. The uproar over the closing of the parks by the NPS resulted in the introduction 
of H.R. 2677 (the National Parks and National Wildlife Refuge Systems Freedom Act of 
1995) and H.R. 2706 (the National Wildlife Refuge Mnaagement Contingency Act of 
1995) that would have authorized state employees to perform functions of the NPS and 
the USF&WLS during times of shutdowns by the federal government. The bills failed to 
pass. 
Congress held hearings on H.R. 2677 and 2706. An Arizona congressman, Mr. 
Cooley, stated to the House Committee on Resources that he could not use the facilities at 
Lake Powell during the period that the federal government was closed because of the lack 
of appropriations. H.Rep. 104-51, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 17. The Assistant Secretary 
of the Interior testified concerning the bills and the closing of the national parks during 
the government shutdown stating that the state officials were not functionally qualified to 
operate national parks. Id. at pp. 36-38. The Assistant Secretary noted that the missions 
of the national parks and its employees are much different than the mission of the state 
counterparts. Id. p. 37. He also opined that all fees collected from within the parks are 
obligated to go the General Treasury of the United States inasmuch as the states have no 
legal provision for assuming those fees. Id. p. 38. 
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The NPS asserted its supreme authority over the territory of the GCNRA on other 
occasions, such as when it closed the Hobie Cat Beach area to all vessels and vehicles, 
including water craft, over the Memorial Day Weekend, from May 24 to May 30, 1995 
for the reason that public use during this period undermined law enforcement and safety, 
and created sanitation problems. See Addendum, News Release, National Park Service, 
May 6, 1995. 
The foundation that the State has chosen to build the defense of its jurisdictional 
authority on is Richardson v. Turner, 16 Utah 2d 371, 401 P.2d 443 (1965). This case 
concerns a criminal defendant who sought to avoid state prosecution on the ground that 
the military base where the alleged crime occurred was a military reservation where state 
criminal laws did not apply. The Utah Supreme Court accepted the defendant's stipulation 
that the land was never owned by the State, that the land was originally part of the public 
domain and that the land had eventually been withdrawn from the public domain by the 
Secretary of the Interior and used as a part of a military reservation. 401 P.2d at 444. 
That court did not have before it the issue of federal preemption nor was there any 
evidence offered that would have supported a decision based upon federal preemption. 
Rather, that court considered whether the subject federal public domain land that was 
originally subject to state jurisdiction automatically became subject to exclusive federal 
jurisdiction when the public domain use was converted to federal military purposes. 
Inasmuch as the court was presented with a military base issue the court analyzed the 
issue pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution 
pertaining to the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals and the like. The Appellants have 
never contended that the GCNRA was created pursuant to this provision of the 
Constitution. 
Instead, the Appellants have sought to be free of added regulation by the State by 
relying upon the power of Congress to enact laws that would have the effect of 
preempting the State from intruding into geographic areas of dominant federal interests 
-5-
when comprehensive federal laws were enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, Article 
I, Section 8, Clause 3, the Admiralty and Maritime Powers Clause, Article III, Section 2, 
Clause 1, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. It is 
unnecessary for Appellants to show a conflict of state and federal laws to establish federal 
preemption where Congress has a pervasive scheme for waterways in its parks; 
nonetheless, the very existence of extensive legislative and regulatory coverage of the 
GCNRA adequately demonstrates that Congress intended that its laws affecting the 
GCNRA take precedence over all State laws not otherwise given force by Congress 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. 
Congress in the Submerged Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29, codified at 43 U.S.C. §§1301 et 
seq., reserved to itself that the use, development, improvement, or control by or under the 
constitutional authority of the United States of submarginal lands and waters when such 
lands and waters are used for navigation or flood control or the production of power or 
when such lands and waters are used for the improvement of the same. 43 U.S.C. 
§1311(d). It has long been established that the Colorado River is a navigable waterway, 
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), and that the federal government has 
paramount navigational servitude there. Bonelli Cattle Co. V. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 
(1973). Through a series of congressional acts described extensively in the Appellants' 
opening brief, Congress expressly dedicated the uses of the Glen Canyon reservoir waters 
to all of these uses, plus Congress added public recreation as a use. 
The National Park Service ("NPS") has contracted with a concessioner to provide 
boating facilities, including boat slips, boat storage, boat rentals, and boat sales. Boat use 
and other water recreation is regulated by the NPS and the Coast Guard. States that 
impose their individual laws in any manner that interferes with this unique federal 
responsibility disturb Congress' scheme for the National Park System and the scheme for 
the recreational use of the Colorado River. 
-6-
B. Congress Occupies the Field of Water Recreation On Navigable Waters 
Within National Parks 
Congress could not have been clearer in staking out a dominant position for the 
Secretary in regulating boating. Congress has directed the Secretary to use his discretion 
to promulgate and enforce regulations concerning boating and other activities on or 
relating to water located within areas of the National Park System, including waters 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; provided that such regulations are 
complementary to the authority of the Coast Guard. 16 U.S.C. § la-2(h) (1994). "Water 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" include navigable waters. See H.Rep. No. 
1569, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., 4292 (1976). This same water jurisdiction refers to waters 
over which the United States exercises commerce clause authority. Thus, NPS regulations 
at Parts 1 through 5, Part 7, and Part 13 (including the 10 enumerated regulations) apply 
on such waters located within the park boundaries regardless of status. 
The need for this degree of power in the Secretary is most obvious when a large 
area within a remote part of the Nation, such as the GCNRA, is involved. As noted in the 
Since the filing of the opening brief, the President of the United States has further isolated 
the GCNRA by proclaiming and reserving from the public domain another 1.7 million 
acres in the immediate vicinity as the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument. 
Proclamation of the President, No. 6920, September 18, 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 50223. The 
proclamation reserved to the State the responsibility and authority to regulate hunting and 
fishing on federal lands within the monument while also noting that the national 
monument shall be the dominant reservation. Id. Addendum. 
The State is unimpressed with the extensive federal laws that the Appellants have 
referenced, preferring instead to deem the broad scope of these federal laws as being 
irrelevant to "field occupation preemption." The State seeks to send the court on an 
inspection tour of specific federal laws and regulations to determine if they conflict with 
specific state laws and regulations. In the reasoning of the State if there is no direct 
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specific conflict there is no federal preemption. The State's analysis is flawed. Under the 
State's narrow view of federal preemption the State could regulate any minutia that the 
federal agency failed to specifically address. For example, if the federal agency did not 
address the issue of the use of wiener sticks in its regulation of picnics then the State's 
position is apparently that it could regulate wiener sticks. 
The court must identify the "field of interest", then determine whether the Congress 
has chosen to operate in that field, and finally determine whether Congress intended to 
dominate the field to the exclusion of the state. The "field of interest" that is before this 
court consists of a specific federal land area within a portion of Utah and Arizona and a 
field of interest involving water recreation within that land area. Congress removed the 
geographic field of interest at issue in this case from the public domain and reserved it to 
a broad scope of federal interests. Then Congress applied a number of specific laws and 
regulations to the withdrawn area. Added to the specific laws are a number of 
congressionally enacted federal laws of general application. 
Without an explicit statement by Congress the courts are faced with the highly 
subjective question of congressional intent to occupy the field. Case law has provided 
some guidance for determining when an occupation of the field may have occurred, such 
as: (1) a scheme of regulation is so broad and detailed as to be comprehensive, and (2) 
because of the comprehensiveness of the federal regulation any further attempt by the 
states to regulate the field would frustrate Congress' vision for the field. Nonetheless, a 
state law may be preempted even when Congress does not occupy the field if the state law 
"stands as an obstacle to the full purpose and objectives of Congress." Abbott v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir.1988); Massachusetts Medical 
Soc'v v. Dukakis. 815 F.2d 790, 791 (1st Cir.1987), cert, denied, 108 S.Ct. 229 (1987). In 
International Paper Co.v. Ouellette, 107 S.Ct. 805 (1987), the court recognized that the 
Clean Water Act did not occupy the field of regulating water pollution, but that court 
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nonetheless found that, by the federal agencies estabUshing an elaborate permit system for 
the discharge of pollutants, Congress had established a delicate balance that should not be 
upset by state law. 
In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942), the Supreme Court 
found that the federal government had occupied the field of butter regulation to the 
exclusion of the state. Preemption was based upon the fact that the Department of 
Agriculture had been authorized by Congress to protect consumer interests "throughout the 
process of manufacture and distribution." The court did not look to any statutory 
language expressing the intent to prevent state regulation; instead, the Court was 
persuaded that the detailed statutes and regulations that the federal government had 
established precluded interference by the states. Id. at 168. 
The State and Amicus vigorously challenge the Appellants' assertion that Congress 
has not conferred jurisdiction upon the states to regulate boating activities within the 
GCNRA. These states rely upon the fact that the Federal Boat Safety Act allows the states 
to adopt identical laws to the federal law which the states can then enforce. Rather than 
being a source of broad state authority to regulate boating in the GCNRA, the Federal 
Boat Safety Act is limited state authority to regulate boating in areas that are not subject 
to the regulations of the NPS and the Coast Guard. Within the water areas that are 
subject to the exclusive regulation by the Secretary and the Coast Guard, the Federal Boat 
Safety Act has no application through the power of the states. 
The directive of Congress to the Secretary concerning boating within the National 
Park System is to complement the Coast Guard's authority so that between the two 
agencies the regulation of boating is complete. That is not to say that the Secretary has 
the authority to regulate outside of the National Park System in ways that will infringe 
upon the states' regulatory authority over boats there. To the extent that the State and 
Amicus assert that they have authority over boating safety under the conditions that 
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Amicus describes in its brief within their respective states outside of the GCNRA they are 
correct. Amicus brief at pp. 8-9. However, the authority granted by the Federal Boat 
Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. § 13101, does not confer jurisdiction upon the states to act within 
areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction or to act where the state does not already possess 
jurisdiction. 
State power within a navigable water is limited. For example, a state cannot forbid 
a foreign owned vessel that has been enrolled and licensed by the United States as 
American flag ships to be barred from fishing pursuant to state laws. Douglas v. Seacoast 
Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977). Nonetheless, that Court noted that the regulation of 
fishing is a field that has been customarily occupied by the states, 431 U.S. at 272, and 
that there are circumstances where the state has a legitimate interest that can be asserted 
without infringing upon the supreme power of the United States over navigable waters. 
However, in exercising non-conflicting state interests over navigation, the Court also made 
it clear that the grant or recognition of power in the states to do an act did not carry with 
it the destruction of the federal power to preempt. Douglas went on to hold that the 
Submerged Lands Act gives the states "title," "ownership," and "the right and power to 
manage, administer, lease, develop, and use" the lands beneath the oceans and natural 
resources in the waters within the state territorial jurisdiction. 43 U.S.C. §1311(a). 
Congress nonetheless expressly retained to the United States "all constitutional powers of 
regulation and control" over these lands and waters "for purposes of commerce, 
navigation, national defense, and international affairs." 43 U.S.C. §1314(a). This was so 
because Congress granted certain specified power to the states under the Property Clause 
of the Constitution. 
The Douglas court noted that if every state imposed discriminatory fishing laws 
there would occur a Balkanization of interstate commercial activity which the Constitution 
intended to prevent. 431 U.S. at 286. For this reason the Virginia statute was deemed 
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preempted. Nonetheless, the Court noted that the state could impose reasonable and 
evenhanded conservation measures. Id. at 287. 
The fact that a federal statute reserves a regulatory position to the states, such as 
that referred to at 36 C.F.R. § 3.1 and the President's Grand Staircase proclamation does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to authorized the states to 
regulate in all other areas not specifically reserved to the United States. Courts do not 
resolve preemption issues simply by comparing the objectives of the federal and state 
regulations. If the purpose of the state regulation was alone controlling, a state could 
enact legislation that hindered or prevented the intended beneficiary of the federal statute 
from enjoying the federal benefit that was bestowed by federal statute. "[W]here failure 
of . . . federal officials affirmatively to exercise their full authority takes on the character 
of a ruling that no such regulations is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of 
the statute," states are not permitted to use their police power to enact such a regulation. 
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767, 774 (1947). 
Another court construed this statement to mean that "we [the federal government! haven't 
done anything because we have determined it is appropriate to do nothing." Missouri 
Pacific R. Co. v. Railroad Comm's of Texas. 833 F.2d 570, 576 (5th Cir.1987). 
The State would also direct the court to construe 46 U.S.C. § 12307 as a source of 
authority for the proposition that Congress has not occupied the field so that the State may 
impose its property taxes as a condition to boat registration. The Statue states: 
The authority issuing a number . . . may 
prescribe regulations and establish fees to carry 
out the intent of this chapter. . . . A State 
issuing authority may impose only conditions for 
vessel numbering that are - (1) prescribed by . . 
. regulations of the Secretary . . . or (2) related 
to proof of payment of State or local taxes. 
That statute cannot be construed as conferring upon the State any jurisdictional 
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authority to regulate boat registration that the State did not have already. This statute is 
one of general application. The statute authorizes the "issuing authority" to prescribe 
regulations and establish fees if the entity already possesses jurisdiction to do so. The Act 
did not empower the State to establish registration requirements and to levy taxes where 
jurisdiction did not previously exist. 
As a recreational facility created by Congress in a primitive and remote area 
Congress contemplated that services to the public would be provided by the federal 
government. The Concession Policy Act of 1965, codified at 16 U.S.C.. §20, its 
legislative history demonstrate that Congress was aware that in these circumstances the 
NPS has the authority to require the concessioner to provide services that the NPS does 
not provide. See S.Rep. No. 765, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 1, et seq, 
1. Absolute Federal Control of Water Storage Confers Absolute 
Federal Jurisdiction 
The geographic area within the GCNRA is or will soon consist of solely federal 
lands that have been withdrawn from the public domain and reserved to federal agencies 
for several congressional mandated purposes. See Appellants' opening brief, p. 5. 
Congress has authorized, and the federal agencies have caused to occur, the inundation by 
water of a significant portion of these lands for the Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir. 
Both the water and the land have been reserved by Congress to serve a number of federal 
purposes. 
The federal purposes for the use of the water include storage. See Colorado River 
Storage Project Act of 1956, 52 Stat. 31. Within the reservoir itself where the NPS and 
the Coast Guard have primary responsibility, stored water is used non-consumptively for a 
wide variety of recreational uses, including boating, boat storage, water sports, sight 
seeing, fishing, hunting, and the like. 36 C.F.R. Parts 3 and § 7.70. Where the Bureau 
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of Reclamation is primarily responsible, the stored water is released from the reservoir to 
generate electrical power and to serve downstream users who contract with the BOR or to 
fulfill international treaty requirements in Mexico. See 43 C.F.R. Part 431; Colorado 
River Basin Project Act, P.L. 90-537, section 602; 27 Fed. Reg. 6851, July 19, 1962. 
Where the United States Fish and Wildlife Service is primarily responsible, stored water is 
relied upon to maintain habitat for various species and wetlands, or requisite amounts of 
water may be released when the agency and the federal reservoir manager deem it 
appropriate to meet other wildlife needs downstream by using such techniques as flushing 
the riverine system, maintaining minimum stream flows and the like. See 50 C.F.R. Parts 
1-100. Where water salinity must be removed to meet international treaty obligations to 
Mexico, the Secretary of Agriculture becomes involved. See 43 U.S.C. § 1592 and 7 C.F. 
R. Part 702. The water in this reservoir is totally appropriated to the congressional 
approved uses described herein. 
If the control of the molecules of water stored in the reservoir are totally within the 
jurisdiction of the federal agencies, a point that does not seem to be contested by the 
State, it is reasonable to conclude that activities concerning those same stored water 
molecules would also be subject to the control of those same federal agencies. If it is 
uncontested that the NPS has exclusive authority under the Concessions Policy Act, 16 
U.S.C, §§ 20 et seq., to regulate business (concessions) in the GCNRA, including water 
recreational activities provided by the concessioner, United States v. Carter, 339 F.Supp. 
1394 (D.Ariz. 1972), then the boats, the boat slips, and other related boating and 
recreational activities that the NPS and its concessioner provide, whether owned by the 
NPS, its concessioner or private persons, should also be subject to the exclusive authority 
of the Secretary. The NPS concessioner is granted the exclusive franchise to provide all 
water recreation vessels and related paraphernalia that is rented or sold within the 
GCNRA. See Addendum. 
During the second session of the 104th Congress, the National Park System was 
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made less dependent upon annual appropriations from Congress, and the Secretary was 
empowered to self-finance much of its operational and maintenance costs. This fee 
program will demonstrate the feasibility of user-generated cost recovery for the operation 
and maintenance of recreation areas or sites and habitat enhancement projects on federal 
lands. Act of April 26, 1996, P.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-200; Act of May 2, 1996, P.L. 
104-140, § 1(a), 110 Stat. 1327. Congress appears intent on assuring the public that the 
parks will not need to depend upon any entity other than the federal government to meet 
operational needs. 
Congress' willingness to seek ways to fund the operations of the park system from 
both national taxation and user fees is an expression of policy by Congress that the 
National Park System is the absolute domain of the federal government. 
The State cites the Secretary's regulation at 36 C.F.R. § 3.1 as evidence that federal 
preemption has not occurred (Appellee's Brief at p. 16), that no conflict exists between 
federal and state laws (Appellee's brief at 19), that there is no national interest in 
preempting the application of state law in the GCNRA. (Appellee's Brief at 25). The 
State's understanding of the term "adopted" as used in 36 C.F.R. § 3.1 leads it to a faulty 
conclusion. 
The Secretary is charged by Congress with administering the recreation areas in a 
manner in which in his judgment will best provide for (1) public outdoor recreation 
benefits, and (2) certain conservation, scientific, scenic, and historical values. 16 U.S.C. § 
460dd. In administering the recreation areas the Secretary may utilized such statutory 
authorities pertaining to the administration of the national park system, and such other 
statutory authorities otherwise available to him. Specifically, in the act creating and 
governing the GCNRA, Congress obligated the Secretary to permit hunting, fishing, and 
trapping within the waters and lands in the GCNRA, but permitted the Secretary 
promulgate regulations concerning those activities so long as those activities were 
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regulated "in accordance with applicable laws of the United States and the States of Utah 
and Arizona, except that the Secretary may designate zones . . . for reasons of public 
safety, administration, or public use and enjoyment." 16 U.S.C. § 460dd-4. Secretarial 
regulations are to be promulgated after there has been consultation state fish and game 
personnel. Id. 
The language in the GCNRA Act is nearly identical to language that the federal 
district court construed in United States v. Buehler, 971 F.Supp. 971 (E.D. Wash.1992), 
affirmed 3 F.3d 31. There the defendant was fishing within a national recreation area 
where he was charged with refusing to show his fishing license to a National Park ranger. 
The ranger charged the defendant with violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) which alleged that 
the defendant had intentionally interfered with an agency function, namely interfering with 
the ranger checking for a valid fishing license and other valid identification. The trial 
court noted that the prosecution had to show that (1) the United States had jurisdiction to 
act, and (2) each element of the offense has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The defendant asserted that he was not required to show his state issued fishing license to 
the ranger because the ranger did not have authority to enforce state fishing laws. The 
defendant noted that the license stated that he was to show the license to state wildlife 
employees when requested but that the license did not require him to show it to the 
federal ranger. 
The Buehler court held that the National Park ranger had substantially the same 
power and duty as other federal law enforcement officers, including the authority to 
enforce federal law in national parks and recreation areas, citing United States v. Gibson, 
896 F.2d 206, 209 (6th Cir.1990). The court found that state law prohibited the 
defendant's activity and further applied 36 C.F.R. § 2.3(a) that adopted non-conflicting 
state laws as part of the Secretary's regulations. The court concluded that "the rangers 
were performing an authorized agency function pursuant to federal law when they 
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contacted the Defendant." 793 F.Supp. at 974. Thus, the court treated the state law as one 
that became federal law by adoption. When a federal regulation covers an incident it is 
enough to charge the offending party with the federal offense without adopting state law. 
United States v. Palmer, 945 F.2d 246, 247 (9th Cir. 1991). 
The Secretary has available to him the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 13, 
if the scope of federal law is insufficient to cover an activity. United States v. Kaufman, 
862 F.2d 236, rehearing denied (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Mavberry, 774 F.2d 1018 
(10th Cir. 1985). However, the state law that is applied is in essence federal law. Id. 
Thus, the State's reliance upon 36 C.F.R. § 3.1 as evidence that federal preemption has 
not occurred has no basis in case law. 
Among these current regulations is the authority of the superintendent to issue 
boat permits when he deems it appropriate (§3.3), the requirement for involved persons to 
report accidents (§3.4), the authority of NPS personnel to stop and board boats to examine 
documents, licenses or permits and to inspect the vessel to determine and enforce its safe 
operation (§3.5), the prohibition of reckless or negligent operation of vessels, the 
establishment of speed in specified areas, the establishment of regulatory markers, the 
prohibition of operations within specified areas, the prohibition of specified activities on 
boats, the movement of boats on land, the accessing of boats to the water, and the 
regulation of the size, length or width of the boat (§3.6), the prohibition of noise above a 
specified decibel (§3.7), the restrictions on water skiing (§3.20), the prohibition of 
swimming and bathing under specified circumstances (§3.21), the restrictions on the use of 
surfboards (§3.22), the restrictions on snorkeling and SCUBA diving (§3.23). More 
recently, the Secretary has proposed regulations that would allow the NPS to regulate 
individual and vessel access to park waters to prevent or minimize the risk of 
unintentional introduction of injurious non-indigenous aquatic species into park waters 
under the Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 (16 
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U.S.C. § 4701). 
The Secretary also adopted as part of NPS regulations state laws concerning traffic 
and the use of vehicles within the National Park System to the extent that he has not 
developed specific regulations. (Part 4). Nonetheless, in Part 4 the Secretary promulgated 
specific regulations governing the use of emergency vehicles, accident reporting, confined 
travel to public roads within the park, established weight loads and size limits on the park 
roads, enforces traffic control devices, control the use of alcoholic beverages, compels the 
use of safety belts, imposes right of way yields for pedestrians, establishes speed limits, 
establishes standards for offenses less serious than reckless driving, prohibits motor 
vehicles operation under the influence of drugs and alcohol, restricts the use of bicycles, 
and prohibits hitchhiking. Part five regulates commercial and private operations within 
the parks, Part 6 regulates solid waste disposal, Part eight imposes national labor standards 
on employees of NPS conessioners, Part nine regulates mining, Part 10 describes the 
process for disposing of dead animals, Part 14 governs rights of way, Part 17 regulates the 
conveyances of real property interests, Part 51 regulates the type of business that is 
allowed to operate and the manner in which it conducts such business, and Part 71 permits 
the imposition of entrance, use and special use fees. 
Part seven at §7.70 establishes rules that are unique and specific to GCNRA. 
These rules include regulating white water rafting and the assembly and launching of rafts 
and boats. 
Amicus is particularly alarmed that if the Appellants prevail in this appeal that the 
cooperation between the states and the federal agencies will disappear and that the safety 
of boating will be affected by the lack of enforcement of the Federal Boat Safety Act. 
See Amicus Brief at pp. 10-12. Appellants are not arguing that they should be free of 
regulation. They only assert that they should be free of state enforcement of state boating 
laws pertaining to registration that offend their constitutional rights. 
The State also misses the point being made by the Missouri River Basin cases 
-17-
involving the Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction vis a vis navigable waters there. Although 
the cases cited by the Appellants arose within Indian reservations the instruction of those 
cases was very simply that the federal government, through the Corps, had primary 
jurisdiction over the lands and property interests taken for dam and reservoir purposes. 
The presence of an Indian tribe as the prior land owner made the extent of federal 
jurisdiction less certain. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993); Lower 
Brule Sioux Tribe v. State of South Dakota. 711 F.2d 809, 826 (8th Cir.1983), cert, denied, 
464 U.S. 1042; Lower Brule Sioux v. United States. 712 F.2d 349, 354 (8th Cir.1983). 
What is relevant from those cases is the point of law that the federal agency delegated 
power by Congress to regulate a dam and reservoir project have primary jurisdiction to do 
so when an Indian Tribe with treaty rights is involved, and that when there are no treaty 
rights involved the jurisdiction becomes exclusive in the federal government. 
C. Exclusive Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction Applies to Water 
Recreation in the GCNRA 
Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 provides that "The judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . . . to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction . . . . " Congress has codified that power by vesting in the 
district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over "[a]ny civil case of admiralty or 
maritime jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. §1333(1). Torts involving vessels where the 
conditions of location and connection with maritime activity are met are heard in 
admiralty. Jerome B. Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S.Ct. 1043, 
1047 (1995). With admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty 
law. Absent a relevant statute, the general maritime law, as developed by the judiciary, 
applies. East River S.S.Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986). 
Exclusive federal jurisdiction exists as to remedies in rem for any cause of action 
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within admiralty jurisdiction. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 124 
(1924). In exercising in personam jurisdiction, a state court may adopt such remedies and 
attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit so long as it does not attempt to make changes 
in the "substantive maritime law." Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 
556, 561 (1954). State law may supplement federal maritime law, such as in exercise of 
state's police power, but state law may not conflict with federal maritime law. In re 
Exxon Valdez, 767 F.Supp. 1509 (D.Alaskal991). General maritime law preempts state 
causes of action and remedies consistent with long-standing desire of Congress and 
judiciary to achieve uniformity in exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Texaco Refining and 
Marketing, Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61, rehearing overruled, cert, 
denied 502 U.S. 908 (1991). The purpose behind the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the 
federal judiciary was to protect and promote maritime shipping industry through the 
development and application, by neutral federal courts, of a uniform and specialized body 
of federal law. Adams v. Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437 (9th Cir.1975). 
Admiralty jurisdiction exists over a claim arising from a collision between a 
swimmer and a pleasure boat because the claim rested on an allegation of negligent 
navigation of the boat. Oliver v. Hardestv, 745 F.2d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 1984) and when a 
swimmer attempted to board or disembark a vessel docked in navigable waters, White v. 
United States 53 F.3d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 1995), when two boats collide in navigable waters, 
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982), when a fire occurred aboard a 
pleasure boat that spread to other boats at a marina and a dock, Sission v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 
358, 367 (1990), when a pile driving crane attached to a barge caused water to flood a 
tunnel and other buildings, Jerome B. Grubart, supra, when a marine product is faulty and 
causes injury as a result of product liability. East River S.S. Corp, supra. 
Exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction add yet another basis for Congress 
excluding the State from regulating water recreation on navigable waters in the 
circumstances present at the GCNRA. When a state ventures excessively into the 
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regulation of commerce, it "trespasses upon national interests." Great A & P Tea Co. v. 
Cornell, 96 S.Ct. 923, 928 (1976). 
III. NATIONAL INTERESTS ARE ADVANCED BY FEDERAL PREEMPTION 
The unitary National Park System and the applicability of the general maritime 
laws compel uniformity in how boat use occurs within the GCNRA. At one time the 
National Park System was administered in three categories - natural, historical, and 
recreational - with the policies for their governance to be determined by the nature of the 
areas and their historical use. However, in the General Authorities Act of 1970, 16 
U.S.C. §§ la-1, et seq. Congress declared: 
[T]hat the national park system . . . has since 
grown to include superlative natural, historic, 
and recreation areas in every major region of the 
United States; . . . That these areas, though 
distinct in character, are united through their 
inter-related purposes and resources into one 
national park system as cumulative expressions 
of a single national heritage; . . . and that it is 
the purpose of this Act to include all such areas 
in the System and to clarify the authorities 
applicable to the system . . . 16 U.S.C. §la-l. 
The Act added that "[e]ach area within the national park system shall be 
administered in accordance with the provisions of any statute made specifically applicable 
to that area[,]" as well as any other applicable authorities, "including but not limited to the 
[Organic Act]." 16 U.S.C. § lc. In 1978, Congress again stated its intention that: 
[T]he promotion and regulation of the various 
areas of the National Park System . . . shall be 
consistent with and founded in the purposes 
established by [the Organic Act], to the common 
benefit of all the people of the United States. 
The authorization of activities shall be construed 
and the protection, management, and 
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administration of these areas shall be conducted 
in light of the high public value and integrity of 
the National Park System and shall not be 
exercised in derogation of the values and 
purposes for which these various areas have 
been established , except as may have been or 
shall be directly and specifically provided by 
Congress. 16 U.S.C § la-1. 
As a result of these amendments to the Organic Act, the NPS concluded that 
Congress conceived of the park system as an integrated whole. Michigan United 
Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.ed 202, 205 (6th Cir.1991); Bicycle Trails Council of 
Marin v. Babbitt 82 F.3d 1445, 1452 (9th Cir.1996). Congress also found that the 
National Park System was intended "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic 
objectives and the wild life therein . . . in such manner and by such means as will leave 
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future gnerations[,]" 16 U.S.C. §1, "except as may 
have been or shall be directly and specifically provided by Congress." 16 U.S.C. § la-1. 
The Michigan United court concluded that the NPS could rationally find that the NPS's 
primary function which respect to wildlife is preservation unless Congress has declared 
otherwise. 949 F.2d at 207. That court went on to conclude that a park regulation that 
excluded "trapping" in a NPS facility was a lawful regulation. 
Similarly, a district court concluded that the Secretary had the power to adopt 
regulations that prohibit hunting and fishing in the National Park System, except as 
specifically contemplated by Congress. National Rifle Ass'n of America v. Potter, 628 
F.Supp. 903 (D.D.C.1986). In both instances it can be presumed that the laws of the 
states in which these facilities were located had hunting, fishing and trapping laws. In 
neither case did the party that desired the authority to hunt, fish or trap, or the court, rely 
upon state laws as authority for their position. 
The GCNRA is a part of an integrated National Park System where national 
purposes, goals, and objectives are furthered. As the name implies, the area is intended to 
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provide water related recreational opportunities, among others, in an otherwise arid 
environment, as well as to preserve scenic, scientific, and historical features. H.Rep. No. 
92-1446, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. As a part of an integrated system, recreational users 
should be able to rely upon a common system for boat registration. For example, boaters 
at Lake Meade and Lake Mojave, also on the main stem of the Colorado River, should be 
able to use their boats interchangeably among these reservoirs. However, the registration 
requirements of the State of Utah at GCNRA are far more expensive for the average boat 
than the registration requirements of both the Coast Guard and the states within which the 
other reservoirs are located. Water recreationists who continue to use the GCNRA and 
pay the registration imposed property taxes do so because of the unique beauty of the area 
rather than what the State of Utah provides in services. 
If this court upholds the power of the State to impose substantial boat registration 
requirements, the GCNRA will eventually become a haven for a limited boating public 
that can afford the cost of the State imposed "admission ticket." Compared to what the 
Coast Guard requires for boat registration and what surrounding states charge for 
registration, the federal concept of a national unitary system, especially on a single 
waterway, will be destroyed by this State's use of concurrent jurisdiction to extract a toll 
from the federal water recreation user. 
Congress intended uniformity for the public to obtain access to national recreation 
area waterways. The result of an adverse holding against the Appellants by this court is 
likely to encourage the states to each create their own "admission ticket" to the National 
Park System, a practice condemned in an analogous situation by the Supreme Court in 
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.. 431 U.S. 265, 286 (1977). 
It is also a well settled national interest that the maritime laws be uniform. Where 
the general maritime laws apply, such laws preempt state laws in order to achieve the long 
standing desire of Congress and the judiciary to achieve uniformity in the exercise of 
admiralty jurisdiction. Texaco Refining and Marketing, Inc. v. Esate of Dau Van Tran, 
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808 S.W. 2d 61, rehearing overruled, cert, denied 502 U.S. 908 (1991). 
IV. THE BOAT REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT AS IMPLEMENTED 
OFFENDS THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The State and Amicus doubt that a dispute about boat registration within the 
GCNRA involves interstate commerce. While acknowledging that "anything that can be 
bought and sold is subject to commerce", Amicus brief at p. 13, n.6, Amicus characterizes 
the Appellants' position as "dubious." This is an odd position to take when the very 
reason that the State of Arizona is participating as amicus is because the CGNRA extends 
into Arizona. It is also a curious position to take when the State of Arizona conceded in 
Department of Revenue v. Moki Mac River Expedition, 773 P.2d 474, 479 (Ariz. 
App.1989) that trips on the Colorado River through the GCNRA from Utah into Arizona 
constitute interstate commerce. 
Where possible, State laws that restrict interstate commerce will be construed so as 
to not offend the Constitution. For example, a state tug boat statute required ships of a 
certain size and design in a certain area of the State of Washington to use a tug boat to be 
escorted through designated areas within navigable waters. The Supreme Court found that 
the tug boat statute could not regulate the size of the ships and their design but that the 
state could require a tug boat to escort the federally regulated ship through certain water 
areas, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978). The distinction that the 
court found was that federal regulation preempted state authority where it was shown, 
among other things, that there was a need for national uniformity, whereas the tug boat 
escort requirement by the state did not affect a uniform national interest. Id. 
Additionally, the same court found that the tug boat rule by the state did not impede the 
efficient flow of interstate and foreign commerce in that the cost of the tug escort was less 
than one cent a barrel of the cargo carried by the tankers. 
The purpose of the federal act and the purpose of the Secretary's and the Coast 
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Guard's regulations that require boat identification are to obtain a means to identify boats 
for public safety reasons. If the State can demonstrate that federal law has given it 
authority to enforce boat identification within the GCNRA then the State must implement 
its authority in ways that do not offend the Constitution. The requirement for the boat 
owner to pay a substantial property tax does not have a reasonable nexus to a legitimate 
state interest to Utah, it discriminates against non-residents of the State of Utah who give 
much in the way of property taxes and receive nothing because the tax is not fairly related 
to the services provided by the state. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 
274 (1977); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 455 U.S. 130, 156 (1982). Thus, the 
State's boat registration requirement cannot survive constitutional scrutiny . 
The imposition of State boat registration requirements would add substantial 
burdens to already adequate, existing and pervasive federal registration requirements. 
The addition of the State's substantial financial requirements would, and has, impede 
broader public use of the federal boating facilities within the GCNRA. Adding the State's 
burdens to the federal requirements clearly amount to interference with the Appellants' 
right to participate in interstate commerce under fair and reasonable terms. Courts will 
hold such unconstitutional intrusion invalid under the Clause alone without the aid of 
legislation. Kassel v. Consol. Freightwavs Corp.. 101 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (1981). By finding 
that the pervasive federal laws and regulations preempt the State from concurrently 
imposing its boat registration laws will restore to the general national public the ease of 
access intended by Congress. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The case before this court is a criminal case. The State has the burden of proof 
that it has the jurisdiction to prosecute the Appellants for failing to have a State of Utah 
boat registration as a precondition to their exercise of federal rights within the GCNRA. 
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There is no evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that shows that the Congress conferred or 
that the State retained concurrent boat registration authority within the GCNRA. The 
most that can be said for the State's authority is that it may require boat identification if it 
comes upon a boat that does not have boat identification that meets federal standards. 
The State's conduct is barred by the Constitution. Its conduct offends the 
Commerce Clause when recreational users invited by Congress to use the GCNRA waters 
are subjected to unreasonable burdens upon their right to use interstate commerce to enjoy 
the privilege. The federal power of Congress and the Executive agencies are pervasive 
and have been exercised pursuant to the Property, the Necessary and Proper, and the 
Admiralty and Maritime Clauses of the Constitution. 
The effect of the State's position is to impose burdens upon the Appellants that 
Congress never intended and to impose burdens which the Constitution forbids. 
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I think that what concerns me most is tne arbitrary nature of 
this closure and the fact that we have a history of cooperation with 
the Park Service. 
Mr. VENTO. Well, we have 
Governor SYMINGTON. Excuse me, Congressman, but I would like 
to make this point. 
The State of Arizona is drastically impacted when you close 
something like the Grand Canyon National Park. There is no need 
to do that in the future. We are willing to help. We are willing to 
give money. We are willing to lend people. We are willing to set 
out parameters to protect the Unitea States Government from li-
ability. 
And so I don't/quite understand how in the face of that kirid of 
a generous offer, our country at the national level could spurn that 
good-faith offer on the part of the sovereign State of Arizona. 
Mr- VENTO. Well, I think my time has expired. 
But I mean, I certainly understand how they could still have— 
reserve questions. And I don't question your good faith. I just ques-
tion the feasibility about a piecemeal basis trying to keep the gov-
ernment operating, when you have this type of shutdown in terms 
of no funds. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. I thank the gentleman from Minnesota who cor-
rectly noted that his time has expired. 
?£?J. would also pause here in my capacity as the Ohair today to ac-
knowledge that Representative Lincoln, one of the sponsors of the 
ing^*Ma& has joined us in the audience. We look forward 
r'th**iueations from Governor Symington will continue. 
sWe will yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon, Mr. 
Cooley, 
Mr. COOLEY. Governor, I don't have any questions to ask you. I 
am just going to make a comment. 
I think it would be to the benefit of the State of Arizona, and also 
the Federal Government, if we just turn this park over to you to 
manage. 
Governor SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Cooley. We would be 
pleased to accept. 
Mr. COOLEY. I wish we could. In your previous statement, you 
talked about arrogance put forth by people in the Federal Govern-
ment. The 104th Congress is here to downsize and change govern-
ment—get rid of some of the arrogant bureaucrats. One way to do 
this is by giving it back to let you run it. I would certainly support 
such a effort. 
Thank you much for your time here. 
Governor SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cooley, 
thank you. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. NOW, the Chair would recognize my colleague 
from the great State of Arizona, a gentleman who also selves on 
this committee, and I am pleased to serv$ with him in this country, 
Mr. Shadegg from the Fourth District. " s ^ 
Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 
I have got to tell you, Governor, that I am absolutely awestruck, 
and my colleague from Oregon used the word that I think is appro-
priate here. To me, it is the absolute height of arrogance to insinu-
ate that for an American or a foreigner, anyone from around the 
world, who comes to the United States to see one of the Seven 
Wonders of the World, and to conceive that they cannot do that, 
they cannot absorb the beauty and take in the beauty of the Grand 
Canyon if they don't have a Federal bureaucrat standing at their 
side, that is unbelievable to me. 
I happened to be here during the shutdown because we remained 
in Washington. I spoke by telephone to an audience in Phoenix, 
and it was the day you were pursuing your effort to open up the 
park both for the visitors who had come from around the world to 
visit and around the Nation, and for people who have established 
businesses and have economic lives at stake there. 
And when I made that comment to that audience, I got a rather 
loud, loud round of applause. They seemed to agree with me that 
they didn't feel they needed a Federal bureaucrat standing beside 
them in order to enjoy the Grand Canyon. 
It also kind of amazed me, because I am a boater, that at the 
same time the Federal Government also shut down Lake Powell. So 
if I understand this, one cannot safely boat on Lake Powell unless 
you have a Federal bureaucrat somewhere nearby to ensure that 
you can do it properly. 
I guess the other point of arrogance is the arrogance that I hear 
that only the Federal Government can do this and that clearly the 
State of Arizona, because it has fewer employees in its park, must 
be doing it wrong and the Federal Government must be doing it 
right. 
I have to tell you that I believe Senator Kyi's letter illustrates 
that this is not an issue of us rushing in to solve a problem that 
doesn't exist or a problem that is being created so we can solve it. 
I think that letter powerfully and dramatically and somewhat sadly 
illustrated the pain that was suffered. 
I also noticea in—I wasn't able to make an opening statement, 
but in Mr. Vento's opening remarks, he talked about a couple of 
things I want to deal with. One of them was—and he used the 
words twice—he said this is an essential Federal Government re-
sponsibility and then he said it is a fundamental Federal respon-
sibility. I pulled out 3 copy of the Constitution, which I learned has 
certain enumerated powers. 
I can't find this as an enumerated power in there. It may well 
be there. I did just a quick survey. But it is somewhat shocking to 
me to believe that during such a break, at least the States couldn't 
assume this responsibility because it is so essentially Federal in 
character. 
One of the points that Mr. Vento brought up goes to the issue 
of the Antideficiency Act. I want to go to that. As I understand it, 
Governor, what you are saying to us is that you are willing to enact 
legislation in which the State would assume all responsibility for 
the operation of the park, all cost for the operation of the park, if 
that is what we have to do in order not to cross the Antideficiency 
Act, and all liability. 
Is that correct? 
Governor SYMINGTON. That is correct. 
Mr. SHADEGG. OK 
Number two. if the shutdown of all or a certain part ot visitors 
services must be done, then as much notice as possible should be 
given to concessioners so that adequate notice to visitors can be 
made who have reservations, may be involved with tour operator 
programs, may have scheduled family events, such as weddings, in-
volving many others with complicated arrangements, et cetera. 
Number three, the fact that we are vulnerable as concessioners 
to Government shutdowns gives us an unfair disadvantage with 
our comparables. Nervous guests tend to book elsewhere, future 
reservations book elsewhere, et cetera. We should expect our rates 
to be based on the risk factor of a Government shutaown plus the 
intangible cost of visitor perception that their vacation plans may 
be tentative and that they cannot rely on a concession being open. 
What we deserve are rate approvals that factor in the possibility 
of a Government shutdown. These rates will compensate us for the 
risk and, at the "same time, net the Government higher revenue 
from franchise fees based on sales. 
Further, realizing that such shutdowns have a devastating eco-
nomic effect on concessions operators and their employees, the NPS 
should be prepared to grant reductions in franchise fees and/or in 
other ways to assist in offsetting such economic losses that always 
accompany such experiences. 
Four, the NPS and its concessions operators should mutually 
work toward a cooperative program which would consider a num-
ber of contingencies in the event of a Government shutdown for 
budgetary or even other emergency reasons. This plan could antici-
pate various possible scenarios or circumstances and what proce-
dures would then be employed to deal with such happenings. 
With reference to H.R. 2677 and H.R. 2706, addressing services 
of State employees to assist the National Park System and the 
Wildlife Refuge System in terms of shutdowns, it would seem that 
such authorizing legislation would be helpful and maybe that the 
State employees could be helpful in such situations, and there 
should be some procedure adopted to make that possible in the fu-
ture. 
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have and thank 
you for the opportunity to testify. 
[The exhibits to the statement of Mr. O'Connell may be found at 
end of hearing.] 
Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. O'Connell, we thank you for your testimony. 
The Chair would simply note and especially sympathize with the 
experience in the wedding. 
Mr. O'CONNELL. Yes. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. And the distress of the mother of the bride. I 
think it scarcely helped to ensure domestic tranquility, which of 
course is one of the missions found in the Preamble of the Con-
stitution. 
Thank you, Mr. O'Connell. We will have auestions for you later, 
Now we call on our friend, Mr. Frampton, fyr his testimony. 
STATEMENT OF GEORGE T. FRAMPTON^ JR., ASSISTANT SEC-
RETARY FOR FISH AND WILDLIFE AND PARKS, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF THE INTERIOR 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
me jfark bervice and the Fish and Wildlife Service are in busi-
ness to keep the parks and the refuges open for the American peo-
ple. We want to keep the parks and the refuges open for the Amer-
ican people. But when the Congress fails to appropriate any money, 
any mnas, for the Department of the Interior, the Park Service, the 
Fish and Wildlife Service, to operate these systems, then we as 
Federal employees have absolutely no choice. We are obligated by 
Federal law, other laws passed by this body, to close these system 
or at least to bring them down to the minimal point at which per-
sonal safety and protection of properties are at least safeguarded. 
We don't have any choice in that matter. We follow the law. 
Now, I heard Governor Symington say he felt that the closure of 
Grand Canyon was arbitrary. Mr. Shadegg said he thought it was 
the height of arrogance to close the park system. 
You know, if Federal employees, doing their best to follow Fed-
eral law, including Federal laws that have criminal sanctions in 
them, such as those in the Antideficiency Act, if that is arbitrary 
or arrogant, then you gentlemen have a different idea about the 
role of law in society than I do. 
We want to keep the parks open. There are some perfectly avail-
able straightforward strategies for preventing this from happening 
again, for Keeping all the parks and refuges open, and the Congress 
can help us with those strategies, and I want to outline those in 
a minute. ^ 
But unfortunately, we don't think that Chairman Young's bill, 
H.R. 2677, is a way to go. We have fundamental objections to that 
bill. We believe it can seriously compromise visitors safety as well 
as the management of resources for which the Department of the 
Interior is responsible. Each of these areas really does have unique 
management problems, unique problems in keeping infrastructure 
running, uniaue hazards. 
The fact oi the matter is th£t to be forced to turn over these 
areas to State employees who are not trained in running these 
areas, who are not familiar with them, poses some very serious 
visitors' safety problems. 
The idea that a transportation unit of the National Guard and 
a few State policemen and some State park supervisors in Arizona 
could protect the hundreds of thousands of people visiting Grand 
Canyon every day I would suggest to you is a very hazardous as-
sumption. 
Moving beyond the serious problems of visitor safetv are the is-* 
sues that relate to resource management. State and Federal areas 
and systems and wildlife areas have different missions and a dif-
ferent set of problems than National Parks and National Wildlife 
Refuges. Protection of those resources is a national responsibility, 
and if you have State employees exercising State responsibilities on 
State standards for doing things like permitting, making compat-
ibility decisions, making resource protection decisions, there is no 
way that the Secretary of Interior can exercise any responsibility 
or hold those people accountable for managing these resources for 
the American public pursuant to fundamental Federal law. 
There are some otner issues here that are not really addressed 
in the Young bill. Liability is one of them. Under the Antideficiency 
Act as we read it, not only can we not pay salaries or other ex-7 
penses to keep the parks operating but we cannot assume liability. 
So it is not really a matter of whether liability would be assumed 
by the State for State employees. 
You know what happens the first time a National Guard flatbed 
truck rolls over some kid? Does the Federal Government get sued 
for that? It is the liability for Federal functions as well during the 
eriod from which there is no appropriations. 
And issues like what happens with fees and who collects the fees 
are also not addressed in the bill. Under current Federal law, fees 
go—Park Service fees go in the General Treasury, and there is no 
legal provision for the State to assume those fees. If the State 
doesn't collect fees, does the Federal Government sue the State for 
failure to collect fees? These are some of the issues that are not ad-
dressed in Mr. Young's bill, H.R. 2677. 
But we don't have to face these, Mr. Chairman, because there are 
perfectly available ways to keep the parks and refuges open. Strat-
egy number one is get us a bill. We are two and a half months into 
a fiscal year, and Congress still has not sent an appropriations bill 
for the Department to the President. 
If the Congress cannot get us a bill, then get us a CR, a clean 
CR that the President can sign and continue to provide the money 
to keep these units open. 
If neither of those strategies is going to be adopted, then there 
are other strategies available to keep the parks and refuges open. 
The most obvious is that we are prepared to try to work out, under 
existing law, procedures in which States could deposit money in an 
account for all of the expenses of the operation or a particular park 
or refuge and indemnify the Federal Government for liability, and 
we would go ahead and continue to operate the park or refuge with 
those funds and that assumption of liability. 
Indeed, I was a little bit surprised to hear Governor Symington 
say—and I wrote down what he said—that they were prepared to 
assume, Arizona was prepared to assume, all trie costs and liabil-
ities of running Grand Canyon National Park, because in fact when 
he made what he characterized as his original good faith offer, 
which we received in the form of a letter and press release, that 
he yvas taking a National Guard unit to Grand Canyon to take over 
the park, we made sure that, by the time he got there, a letter was 
delivered offering on behalf of the administration to work out, sit 
down and work out, with the State a system in which they would 
pay the operational costs of the park on a day-by-day basis and as-
sume liability, indemnify the Park Service, and we would continue 
to operate the park. 
That was two and a half weeks ago, and there were some discus-
sions back and forth in which we offered to sit down on that basis, 
the basis he said this morning he was willing to accept, and there 
are a lot of details to try to work that out , and we have had radio 
silence, Mr. Chairman, from Arizona for two and a half weeks. So 
we have been waiting to sit down and work that out. 
Now, Senator Kyi and I have seen his BiU> at least in draft form. 
He testified that he believed that the Federal Government should 
be allowed to enter into agreements with—for States that are will-
ing to assume—pay the entire tab and assume liability to continue 
to keep parks or refuges open. Now, that is very much along the 
lines of what we offered to try to work out on Grand Canyon and 
have received no response to it. 
I think that is—again, that is a basis on which this Congress 
could help us, in the event of a shutdown, keep parks and refuges 
open. Write legislation that would authorize the Secretary to re-
ceive money from the State for the costs on a day-to-day basis and 
assume liability, and we would continue to operate these units with 
our own well trained people, keep people safe, and avoid all the 
problems of the Antidenciency Act. 
You know, there are several strategies, with or without legisla-
tion, that are available. You could help us to do that without re-
Suiring the Secretary to take whatever State employees or National 
ruard units show up in a National Park and try to protect visitors. 
Let me just close by saying a word about Congresswoman Lin-
coln's bill, which is H.R. 2706. That is not, Mr. Chairman, very 
similar to Mr. Young's bill. It is much more similar to what Gov-
ernor Symington described this morning that he is willing to do, if 
he is really willing to do it, and much more similar to what the leg-
islation that Senator Kyle, I understand, has introduced or is about 
to introduce. 
Her bill basically authorizes the Secretary to enter into agree-
ments to—not to manage whole units but to manage hunts for 
State employees who are qualified, trained, and familiar with the 
area, to manage hunts at State expense in the event of a shutdown. 
Now, we do that already. Fish and Wildlife Service does have 
about 20 percent, 15 or 20 percent, of the hunting that might have 
been otherwise curtailed during the shutdown several weeks ago, 
in fact, were hunts managed by State employees pursuant to coop-
erative management agreements, and we did keep those open, and 
the Fish and Wildlife Service would like to negotiate more of those 
agreements. 
In fact, it is not absolutely clear that H.R. 2706 is necessary and 
that I think we pretty much have the authority to do that now. It 
is not that easy. I am not sure it would be a sensible use of re-
sources to do that for every one of the 272 refuges on which there 
is some kind of hunting in the system, which is a little more than 
half the system. 
But we would be very interested in exploring and would hope, 
you know, that we coula support a bill that made more specific tne 
authority of the Secretary to enter into these kinds of agreements, 
and we would certainly look favorably!at the possibility of support-
ing a bill such as Senator Kyi's or bills along the line that t sug-
gested in which you authorize the Secretary to accept money and 
indemnities in order to keep park and refuge units open in the case 
of States that want to do that for, let's say, a big park that gen-
erates significant tourism revenues. —. 
So we are eager to try to explore those kinds of possibilities, but 
that is very different from being required to accept untrained peo-
Ele who are not knowledgeable, who may be State employees, who I now nothing about parks or park management with—on a totally i 
mandatory basis, ana then impose liability Oh the Federal Govern-
ment for actions of State employees. That is a formula in H.R. 2677 
that we think takes us in the wrong direction if we really want to I 
develop ways to keep these units open during shutdowns. \ 
Now, I am here this morning with John Leshy, who is the Solici-
tor of the Department of the Interior, and he and his office have 
had the principal discussions with Governor Symington, and so he 
is here both to answer questions about some of the legal aspects 
and provide any additional information on that. I don't know 
whether he wants to supplement my comments with respect to the 
Grand Canyon or not. 
Mr. LESHY. Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence I could take 
about one minute and rehash the discussions we have had with the 
State of Arizona. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. That would be fine. 
Mr. LESHY. Thank you very much. 
To respond to z/ couple things the governor said, let me just give 
you a very quick chronology. On November 16th, which was the 
day after, I believe, the Government shutdown, we received a letter 
from Governor Symington. 
Mr.CoOLEY. The 14th. 
Mr."LESHY. The letter from Governor Symington was addressed 
November 16th, to the Secretary, and made an offer which would 
have the Federal employees stay at the Grand Canyon and essen-
tially become State employees under some sort of arrangement. 
The letter didn't specify what kind of arrangement. It did not 
specify anything about liability, and it said that the Federal em-
ployees would become State employees, would collect money, and 
keep half, and give half back to the Treasury. It was a very vague 
letter. ' 
The next thing, we immediately put a team of people to work to 
explore that, to see if there was a basis where we could go forward. 
„ The next thing we knew, we understood the governor was head-
ing for the Grand Canyon with some National Guard people. We 
accelerated our work on how we could respond to the governor's let-
ter and on the next day handed the governor a letter, when he ar-
rived at the Grand Cajiyon, from me which outlined the problems 
with the governor's proposal, and there were a number of them. 
The letter speaks for itself. 
-^-"At the same time, I had a conversation with the attorney general 
I of £he State of Arizona. The attorney general of the State of Ari-
/ zona had written a short opinion which pointed out some legal 
' problems with the governor's proposal under State law. Of course 
the park then reopened a couple of days later. 
"*VWe had some further conversations with the governor's office 
about proceeding on the basis of what I outlined in my letter, 
which Mr. Frampton has talked ^bout as a basis we might be able 
to reach some sort of agreement to go forward. 
The last conversation we had with the governor's office was No-
vember 22nd in which we said we need to talk about the conditions 
as outlined in my letter. We have had a deafening silence-since 
that time. , 
We identified the basic problem as a concern about liability, and 
since November 22nd we have heard absolutely nothing from the 
governor's office until this morning, when we hear the governor ba-
sically say that he is prepared to meet and talk about the condi-
tions that we outlined in terms of the State assuming total cost 
and liability. This is absolutely the first time we have heard that. 
We have lost nearly three weeks in this process. 
This is not something that we have ever done before, and, as my 
letter of November 17th pointed out, we are in some uncharted ter-
ritory, and this has to be very carefully done, and we have lost an 
awful lot of time waiting for the Governor of Arizona to get back 
to us. That has really been a great concern to us. 
I just wanted to set the record straight on what the discussions 
had been back and forth. 
Thank you very much. 
[The statement of Mr. Frampton may be found at end of hear-
ing.] 
Mr. HAYWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Leshy. We also thank Mr. 
Frampton for his testimony. 
Ana, indeed, as we begin the questions, Mr. Leshy, on an unre-
lated matter, Chairman Young, who is unable to be with us today 
but of course whose presence we all note even when he is not phys-
ically here, wanted to know the status of an official request he gave 
you regarding Alaskan land conveyance. When will that informa-
tion be sent to the Chairman? 
Mr. LESHY. I reviewed that this morning, and we have kept the 
Chairman's staff informed of the progress. That letter should be to 
him today or Monday. 
It is easy to ask questions and difficult to answer them. There 
are about 40 pages' worth of answers that he will get very shortly. 
I signed off on it last night, and now it is just really a question of 
putting it together and getting it to him. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. Thank you very much. I know he looks forward 
to receiving that information and he thanks you for those answers. 
Now, Mr. Frampton, I appreciate your testimony today, espe-
cially in your closing remarks about tne notion of cooperation and 
some positive things to say about the Kyle legislation, which of 
course we are constrained from fully discussing here because of the 
rules of this committee. 
I would just like to note for the record that you made what I will 
interpret, I believe charitably, to be a request rather than a de-
mand or an order when you said that we in the Congress should, 
quote, get us a clean CR, end quote. 
I would simply note for the record that it certainly is historical 
fact that we provided the President with a clean CR that he chose 
not to sign, and I know that you in'> fact were requesting rather 
than demanding or ordering the Congress of the United States to 
provide a clean continuing resolution. 
Now, Mr. Frampton, if a Government shutdown occurred on De-
cember 16th—and we all hope that can be averted, but if it were 
to occur, and, again, it affected your Department, what changes 
will you make in your shutdown policy and procedures regarding 
units of the National Park System and the National Refuge Sys-
tem? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Mr. Chairman, I can get you detailed answers to 
that question. 
I know that the original shutdown plan which began to be devel-
oped in July by OMB and resulted in a guidance and a depart-
mental plan and changes in that plan, and which was the plan that 
we followed the last time around, that there have been some iHlnor 
changes to that based on the experience we had. 
But as far as I know, the overall thrust of our shutdown would 
be the same, and that is that we would try to—depending on what 
the prospects were for how many days it would be, we would have 
to bring the Park Service and Fish and Wildlife Park System and 
Fish and Wildlife Refuges basically to the point where we were re-
ducing employment by 80 to 90 percent, which is about what it 
took to get to the point where all we were doing was protecting per-
sonal safety and property. 
So as far as I know, there would not be major changes in the ap-
proach that we used, but I would have to—to the extent that the 
plan has been tinkered with, I would want to get back to you on 
that. 
We tried to use sort of a rule of reason with respect to visitors 
who Were staying in campgrounds and concession facilities in the 
hopes that if we didn't, you know, we gave people some time, we 
dian't really start to try to move some of those people out for a day 
or two in many of the parks in the hopes that perhaps something 
would happen and we would get a CR. 
What we have learned about whether we would apply the same 
guidelines or somewhat different guidelines, I would have to get 
Back to you. 
[The information was not received at time of printing.] 
Mr. HAYWORTH. So for all intents and purposes, to paraphrase, 
aside frcfrn perhaps tinkering around the edges or nibbling around 
the edges, basically there would be no fundamental change in a 
broad philosophical sense from what transpired in November. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Not as far as I know, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. And, Mr. Frampton, were you relatively pleased 
with the actions in the wake of the shutdown and think that was 
the way to go? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. I was very upset to have the parks closed. Con-
trary to, I think, the suggestion that you made in terms of Govern-
ment funding has been interrupted in the parks, I don't believe 
there has ever been a time in the history of tne National Park Sys-
tem when the parks were shut down across the system for any sig-
nificant period of time. 
Previous shutdowns, my understanding is, have occurred for, you 
know, overnight or a few hours at a time, and we sort of waited 
a day to start closing parks or occurred over a weekend. So I don't 
believe there has ever been a time when the gates were really shut 
across the park system for a number of days and visitors moved 
out, and I would very much hope that that doesn't have to happen 
again. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Frampton, I understand that the Atlanta re-
gional director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service negotiated 
agreements with the States of Arkansas and Mississippi that al-
lowed States to keep hunting programs open»on certain refuges. 
These States were surprised when this agreement was rejected by 
officials here in Washington. 
I euess my final cruestion woul& be: Why was this agreement, 
which was negotiated by your career professionals in the field, re-
jected by officials here in Washington, D.C.? 
Mr. FRAMPIV/N. I am not familiar with that agreement, Mr. 
Chairman. You know, the guidelines and the guidance that we are 
operating under basically come from OMB, and it may be that that 
agreement, if there was something in draft that was negotiated, 
didn't meet Federal law or didn't meet those guidelines. 
The approach that we followed with respect to keeping hunting 
open, hunts ongoing, was as follows: Of the 506 refuges in the sys-
tem, there are 272 that are open to hunting in one way or another. 
Of those 272, hunting was only restricted or hunts were canceled 
in situations where they would have had to be managed by Federal 
employees who could not be employed; so there was a safety issue, 
or a resource issue, and that is about half. About 130 of the 505 
refuges had hunting adversely affected. 
In roughly the other 140 refuges in which there was some hunt-
ing, hunting was not impacted during the shutdown, either because 
we had preexisting agreements with States to—for State employees 
to manage the hunt or because the hunting really wasn't managed 
very much by the Federal folks anyway. 
In other words, if it was a matter of somebody climbing over a 
fence, we didn't shut down hunts that weren't managed, we only 
shut down hunts that required active management and salaries to 
be paid. And then there were some of those refuges where there 
was no hunting season. 
So where we had preexisting agreements with the States, those 
allowed us to keep the hunting open, and where the hunting really 
was not very insensitively managed, we left the hunting open. It 
was only where we could not administer the program, and that is 
some way or another on about 130 refuges, where hunting was ad-
versely affected. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. Mr. Frampton, I thank you for that and also ac-
knowledge your admission at the outset that you were somewhat 
uncertain of the reasons but offered your conjecture. 
I would ask for a written response for the reasons that this 
agreement was fundamentally rejected, and I am sure you will be 
happy to provide that to the committee. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. We will, Mr. Chairman. 
[The information was not received at time of printing.] 
Mr. HAYWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Frampton. 
Turning to our friends on the Minority side, I am glad to see my 
good friend from Michigan is here. But we will defer, based on a 
time-honored custom, to our colleague from Hawaii for his ques-
tions in his five minutes. 
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
Mr. Frampton, I presume you have been here for all of the testi-
mony and observations and commentary to this point? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Yes, Mr. Abercrombie, I have. 
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I would just like to say for the record that 
Hawaii is one State that is very, very happy to have Federal em-
ployees in the Federal park system operating. As a matter of fact, 
the State of Hawaii considers that it is a real advantage and oppor-
tunity made available to us, both in terms of the scope of the ac-
tivities and the quality of the employees that are in the National 
Parks in Hawaii. They are unifornuy excellent. 
If there is any complaint about Federal employees, park system 
employees, in Hawaii, I am unaware of it. On the contrary, frankly, 
what we receive are compliments that should be rightfully shared 
with the Department of Interior and the Park Service, I think we 
get credit. 
Most people are not really aware of the difference between the 
State and the park system with respect to areas like Volcanoes Na-
tional Park, if you had the opportunity to be there—I don't know 
whether any of you have had that chance—or Haleakala, even 
Kalaupapa, which as a matter of fact we saw as a distinct—again, 
a distinct advantage. 
For those who are not familiar, Kalaupapa is where Father 
Damien carried oi> his work among victims of Hansen's disease. 
And we would simply be incapable, very frankly, as a State, with 
dealing with the implications of what is likely to be the impending 
designation of saihthood for Father Damien. He is a short step 
away from that. Pilgrims coming from all over the world to a re-
mote corner of the island of Molokai, virtually inaccessible except 
by air and a difficult trail. 
These kind of things make us recognize how important the work 
is that Federal employees do and Park Service employees do. 
Now, I put that forward not only by way of compliment in an at-
mosphere which I think has not been seen that way, I also want 
to establish the context that I am very distressed at the rather oc-
casionally seemingly cavalier expression of—of reflection on Fed-
eral employees, particularly in the park system, so that we are 
looking upon balkanizing, in effect, tne park system in this coun-
try; that somehow at the village or county or State level there are 
excellent parks with wonderful employees, always well funded, able 
to carry out all of their functions with no fiscal difficulties but 
when we reach the Federal level suddenly there is a different kind 
of employee apparently. I don't accept that, and I presume that you 
do not as well. 
In that context, I would say—and I will ask you to comment on 
this—I don't think you can just simply take State or local employ-
ees, thrust them into a National Park situation, and expect the 
same kind of service to take place. 
What I mean by that is not that people would be unwilling, but 
if you are in Volcanoes National Park, you can't just walk in there 
and, simply because you have been trained in another context, take 
over the administration or management of that park. Neither can 
you do it with Haleakala. We have the most rare species in the 
world, silver swords, for example, in Haleakala; the city of Refuge, 
with its Hawaiian history and Polynesian history there. 
Would you agree that National Parks do not necessarily lend 
themselves to interchangeable personnel management and admin-
i s t ra t ion on the spur of the moment? ^ 
Mr. FRAMPTON. I would agree. That was the point. You made the 
point much better than I did, that I was trying to make earlier, 
that National Parks work well because you^aave dedicated people^ 
with decades of training and familiarity not only with visitor serv* 
ices and safety, protection of health and safety, but with the infra-
structure and the management of a park; the radio systems, the 
water treatment systems. 
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. If you are taking a park—I don't want to take 
all the time. In other words, you agree with my observation, I take 
it, in general? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. I do. 
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. All right. In fact, to give as an example, Vol-
canoes National Park, I would hate to be accepting guidance from 
somebody as to where it was safe to walk in Volcanoes National 
Park from somebody who was brought in for the dav from the Na-
tional Guard. That is not what the National Guard is trained for 
in Hawaii, at least as far as I know. I hope they are not. I am on 
the National Security Committee, and I would hope that their 
training takes them into a little bit different area. Otherwise, we 
may be wasting our money at this end. 
May I then take it from your comments and from Mr. Leshy's 
comments that, rather than proceeding with lengthy legislative ac-
tivity, am I correct in my conclusion that you believe you have suf-
ficient executive authority right now to be able to conduct at least 
a dialog at this stage as to whether or not the park system can be 
operated under duress—financial, governmental, administrative or 
otherwise—and that if you would Tike to explore that opportunity 
before we move to the legislative level? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. That is correct. 
As Mr. Leshy said, we have never done this before, and there are 
certainly a lot of details and issues. But we believe that we prob-
ably would be able to enter into an arrangement, without legisla-
tion—we would hope to be able to enter into a relationship with the 
State in which we estimated the total daily costs of running even 
a big park, if the State deposited that—those funds in advance for 
several days in the account, and work out the liability issues, and 
go forward to continue to keep the park open. 
We are optimistic that under that—without any legislation, that 
we could find a way to deal with the problems in the Antideficiency 
Act and other legal problems to do that. 
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. 
Could you grant me one more minute, Mr. Chairman, so Mr. 
Leshy could comment? I think he does want to. I realize I am at 
the end of my time. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. The Chair would be happy to agree to one more 
minute. 
Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. i 
Could you do it in 30 seconds so I can conclude, Mr. Leshy? 
Mr. LESHY. Sure. Nobody has challenged the limitations that we 
see. The State of Arizona has not challenged the problems that we 
have identified with moving forward. 
I would point out the reason that we think we can do something 
like this is that the Park Service is unlike almost every other Fed-
eral agency in that it has the authority to accept cash gifts. Most 
agencies do not. That is the lever here we are trying to pull. This 
is high political drama, but there is a very simple principle at the 
bottom of it. Congress has made it a crime for a Federal employee 
to spend money or incur any obligation where there it not an ap-
propriation to cover it, and that Is the problem we are trying to 
deal with through this sort of cash contribution. 
r. ABhKCKoiw h. iveepmg in \ in mina, anr in conclusion, vir. 
Chairman, I conclude from the conversation that we have had so 
far today that the Department of the Interior, through its Park 
Service, is prepared, without having to go to legislative—the legis-
lative area, it seems to me they are prepared to negotiate an agree-
ment that might be satisfactory, would meet Mr. O'Connell's very 
real difficulties, and others. 
And I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the State of Hawaii 
takes no back seat to anyone in terms of the recognition of how im-
portant tourism is. Our economy is utterly, totally, completely de-
pendent upon it, and I think that anything that can be done on the 
part of Mr. Frampton and his associates to conclude this, short of 
the legislative grind, would be most welcome. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. The time for the gentleman from Hawaii has ex-
pired. 
We thank the gentleman for his point of view on tourism in his 
home State, and we should also note for the record that the pro-
posed legislation does not force States into the action, it simply of-
fers an option to the several States. 
With that in mind, we turn to the Majority side, and the gen-
tleman from Oregon is recognized for five minutes. 
Mr. COOLEY. Mr. Frampton, I wish we had done this under oath; 
[ really do. It seems like we are getting on the same trail that we 
did when we had your testimony on the Endangered Species Act. 
Are you familiar with the Volunteers and Park Guideline, one of 
your own publications? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. I am not intimately familiar with it, no. 
Mr. COOLEY. That's interesting. It has a section which says, 
'What can volunteers do? Volunteers can be utilized in any and all 
parts of the park management system. All levels and types of skills 
can be utilized, and almost any type of work can be performed as 
long as the work that would not otherwise get done during a par-
ticular fiscal year because of ftinding and personnel limitations. 
Would you please define to me what a ranger is, for the record? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Well, a ranger is a series of job classifications 
within the National Park Service. 
Mr. .COOLEY. SO when you say a man is a chief ranger, what do 
you mean? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Well, in a park, the chief ranger is the supervisor 
rf a portion of the park employees, other rangers in the park. 
Rangers provide a variety of services, including visitor protection, 
interpretation, and other management functions. In a given large 
western park, for example, there could be a large division of rang-
ers, a separate maintenance division, a natural resource manage-
ment division, and an administration division. 
Mr. COOLEY. And they all have chief rangers? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. NO. The chief ranger is the person who is the 
aead of the ranger division within the park. The maintenance peo-
ple, the natural resource management peopl^. in> most parks would 
report through a slightly different reporting cnai$ ultimately to the 
superintendent. 
Mr. COOLEY. OK. The shutdown occurred on the 14th, and it ran 
through the 18th. Agreed? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. That sounds right to me. I am not sure those are the correct dates. 
Mr. COOLEY. YOU don't know when the shutdown was? You are 
the deputy director of the Department of Interior, and you don't 
know when the shutdown was? Come on. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. I will take your word, for it. I don't remember the 
exact days. 
Mr. COOLEY. OK. Congressional staff called the Park Service and 
talked to the chief rangers of each one of these parks. These staff-
ers asked about the staffing level during the government shutdown. 
We found that there were 134 operating rangers on duty during 
the shutdown compared to 138 the day before the shutdown. 
It is surprising to me that we didn't cut back on our personnel. 
Rocky Mountain: On the 13th we had 6 rangers, and on the 18th 
we had 6 rangers. This was during the shutdown period. Chat-
tahoochee River: We had 5 on the 13th and 6 on the 18th, during 
the shutdown period. The Golden Gate: The 13th, we had 16 rang-
ers and 54 park police. On the 18th, we had 13 rangers and 41 
park police. Death Valley: We had 12 on the 13th and 13 on the 
18th. One more. Yosemite: We had 17 on the 13th and 16 on the 
18th, one less. 
Grand Canyon: We had 12 on—now, this was on the South Dis-
trict. We had 12 on the 13th and 15 on the 18th. Yet we couldn't 
let anybody in, but we had more rangers. 
Hawaii Volcanic: We had 3 on the 13th, but we dropped to 2 on 
the 18th. Blue Ridge Parkway: We had 21 on the 13th and 20 on 
the 18th. Everglades: We had 13 on the 18th—I mean 21 on the 
13th and 18 on the 16th. And Cape Cod National Seashore: We had 
9 on the 13th and 8 on the 18th. And Indiana Dunes National 
Lakeshore: We had 3 on the 13th and 3 on the 18th. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. DO you want me to explain why that is? 
Mr. COOLEY. NO. I just want to point out to you that 
Mr. FRAMPTON. I certainly hope we had more rangers than 
Mr. COOLEY. We have almost more rangers in half of the parks 
Mr. FRAMPTON. That is correct. 
Mr. COOLEY [continuing], after the shutdown has occurred. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. That is correct. 
Mr. COOLEY. We couldn't pay anybody, we couldn't let anybody 
in, but we had more rangers there. | 
Mr. FRAMPTON. NO, that is inaccurate that we couldn't pay any-body. 
Mr. COOLEY. NO, I said you didn't let anybody in. You shut the parks down. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Let me explain why I hope your numbers are cor-
rect. 
Mr. COOLEY. My numbers are correct. We can have all of the 
chief rangers contacted to verify their accuracy. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Of the total 
Mr. COOLEY. This is necessary, to 
Mr. ABERCROMBIB. Point of order, Mr. Chairman. Point of order. 
I don't think it is necessary to imply to a witness—twice I have 
heard so far—imply that they are subject to perjury charges in just 
answering a question. 1 think we can assume good taith answers 
here. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. I thank the gentleman from Hawaii for his 
point. 
The time of the gentleman from Oregon has expired. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. Mr. Chairman, could I respond to that? 
Mr. HAYWORTH. Certainly. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. It seems to have been raised perhaps that we 
didn't really close the park system. Overall, of the 19,000 employ-
ees in the park system, about 3,200 were considered to be employ-
ees who needed to stay on the job to exercise shutdown functions, 
and that means basically the protection of personal safety and 
property; 3,200 out of 19,000. 
Of those 3,200, al>out 700 were park police, as far as I know, all 
of whom, or almost all of whom, continued to work, and many of 
the rest were rangers, because it is the ranger corps in the Park 
Service that almost—it is a requirement for a ranger to have law 
enforcement training and public safety training. They go to the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Institute, along with the FBI 
and the Secret Service people. 
So naturally, if you are going to try to reduce your work force 
to a skeleton staff, with the goal of protecting personal safety and 
property, what you are going to do is put—keep on the job every 
single person in the organization with Federal law enforcement 
training. 
So I am sure that not only was everybody who had law enforce-
ment training who was there the day before asked to continue on 
duty, but people who may have been on vacation or people who 
may have been on leave the day before were asked to come back 
4n order to fulfill shutdown functions. 
So I would certainly hope that the Park Service did its best to 
make sure that the skeleton staff included everyone within the or-
ganization who was well trained and had experience in law enforce-
ment, emergency medical training, and property protection. 
Mr. COOLEY. You actually increased people in some places. If you 
have no visitors, you have no obligations or liabilities, with n o -
Mr. HAYWORTH. With all due respect 
Mr. COOLEY. And you add people to it. I don't see any justifica-
tion for that. But that is a matter of management. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. The first two days, we had tens of thousands of 
people in the park. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. The time of the gentleman from Oregon has ex-
pired. We thank the gentleman testifying for his response. 
Now we will turn to our friend from Michigan for his five min-
utes. 
Mr. KILDEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
I apologize for being late, but this is a Catholic holy day. Having 
been to church, I am in a very gentle, kindly, charitable mood this 
morning toward everyone on the committee and'those testifying. 
I have great respect for Mr. Frampton, and tb-imply that because 
you might want to check on this, the 14th or the 18th or the 19th 
is something neither incompetent rior being cacy, as a matter of 
fact, I think they went back to work on the 20th. I have great re-' 
opect ior you and those whom you direct, Mr. Frampton. I have 
great respect for those who serve in the Park Service in Michigan. 
In Michigan, the Park Service employees are not only respected, 
they are revered, and I can't quite understand some of the strong 
feelings expressed here. I know we want to seek the truth, but I 
have always found you to be one who is very cooperative and can-
did with this committee, and I have always appreciated that. 
In the Grand Canyon there are 380 employees, 88 emergency em-ployees. 
Have a good day, Mr. Cooley. 
Mr. COOLEY. YOU too. 
Mr. KILDEE. God bless you. 
We have 88 emergency employees, law enforcement employees, 
and those who are responsible for protection of the resources ana 
facilities, and I can understand there can be—some were on 
leave—I can understand the situation there very well. 
I think the Park Service did very well when Congress did not 
complete its responsibility. I think we put a great burden on all the 
agencies of government. I think that the agencies of government 
should be commended for responding as well as they did. It was us 
who didn't do our duty, and I appreciate you not mentioning that. 
I can mention that, Mr. Frampton. 
But I just want to say that I respect those whom you supervise. 
I think they do a great job, and I think they did a very fine job 
under circumstances created by the Congress of the United States. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. I thank my Michigan friend for his words. 
Any response that the gentlemen here would care to give? 
Mr. FRAMPTON. No. 
Mr. HAYWORTH. OK. Thank you. And in that spirit of charity and 
accuracy, I would simply point out to my friend from Michigan that 
during nis—perhaps before he arrived there was a clean continuing 
resolution offered to the other end of Pennsylvania that was turned 
down. So perhaps we have a difference of opinion on where the re-
sponsibility may lie. 
With that taken into account, I would turn to my colleague from 
Arizona for his allotted five minutes. 
Mr. SHADEGG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
In that spirit of charity, let me just try to set the record straight. 
Mr. Frampton, you quoted that I had said that it was arrogant 
to shut the park, and that is not what I said. What I said is that 
it is arrogant to presume that you must have a Federal bureaucrat 
standing by your side in order to enjoy the park, and there is a sig-
nificant difference. 
I would not and did not insinuate that Federal employees ou^ht 
not to abide by the law. Indeed, they should. I am simply saying 
that we ought to, I think, create a structure which clearly we are 
in agreement on, where, if the State or somebody other than the 
Federal Government wants to step in and allow people to enjoy the 
park, we ought to try to do that. 
Mr. FRAMPTON. I apologize if I misunderstood you. 
Mr. SHADEGG. Sure. 
I do also applaud you for your clear supportive remarks regard-
ing the bill tnat Senator Kyi, ih*~Ghairman, myself, and other 
members of the Arizona delegation have all introduced or cospon-
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LAKE POWELL BEACH AREA CLOSED TO VEHICLES & VESSELS 
Superintendent Joseph R Alston announced the closure of the Hobie Cat Beach 
ars£ to a!! vehidss £nd vessels, including psrscnBi vaster craft* over the Memoes! Day 
Weekend- from May 24, 1995, to May 30- 1995. The affected area extends from the 
main launch rBtnp at Bullfrog, in an easterly direction, to the feTy launch ramp 
Visitors who plan on camping at Hobie Cat Beach will be required to park their 
vehicles in designated parking areas. Visitors camping in developed campgrounds, 
where persons per site limits will be enforced, will be allowed to camp in their 
vehicles. 
The closure is the result of a decision by park management to return the 
Bullfrog Marina area to those traditional users who require the marina facilities. During 
previous years, the large Memorial Day crowd has damaged park resources and 
created numerous law enforcement/ safety, and sanitation problems for the ISiationai 
Park Service. This has discouraged tne traditional family user from utilizing xhis area 
for its intended purpose as a marina access to Lake Powell. "In the past, vehicles 
ar\6 vessels located within the Hobie Cat Beach area have been utilized by groups as 
focus points for illegal act iv i t ies/ said Alston. *Bv taking away these focus points, 
it wll! be more difficult for these aetlvMe* to occur without being noticed by law 
-more-
Law enforcement personnel from various county, federal, and state agencies 
wiH be assisting the National Park Service at Bullfrog, Wahweap, and Lone Hock 
during This busV holiday weekend In addition to concentrating on the Bullfrog Marina 
ares, taw enforcement personnel will be present at Upper Bullfrog Bay, Stanton Creek, 
Loot? rtOokf anU other popuiar vehiCie aCucSoiuic areas t-c prevent portkC.p^ntw from 
relocating this activity to another site- "Our primary gual is to shut this activity down 
at Bullfrog and assure our tradition visitors it will not De moved to anotner location/ ' 
s&id Alston. 
"Spending Memorial Day Weekend at Lakfc Powell, with family and friends, in 
a safe, conscious, Saw abiding manner Is a tradition we support and encourage. 
Although our goai is to have an arrest free holiday over Memorial Day Weekend, 
visrtors who intentionally violate trie law wilt be bandied by on-site iaw enforcement 
personnel." said Alston, 
Aft pubfic use facfYftces an Lake Powell wf/f be open and available over the 
Memorial Day Weekend. Visitors should be prepared for crowded conditions, and 
some traffic delays and congestion in the Bullfrog area due to ongoing construction 
projects. 
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PROCLAMATIONS 
Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument 
[No. 6920, September 18, 1996, 
61 Fed. Reg. 50223] 
By the President of the United States of America 
A Proclamation 
The Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument's vast and austere land-
scape embraces a spectacular array of scientific and historic resources. This 
high, rugged, and remote region, where bold plateaus and multi-hued cliffs 
run for distances that defy human perspective, was the last place in the 
continental United States to be mapped. Even today, this unspoiled natural 
area remains a frontier, a quality that greatly enhances the monument's 
value for scientific study. The monument has a long and dignified human 
history: it, is a place where one can see how nature shapes human endeavors 
in the American West, where distance and aridity have been pitted against 
our dreams and courage. The monument presents exemplary opportunities 
for geologists, paleontologists, archeologists, historians, and biologists. 
The monument is a geologic treasure of clearly exposed stratigraphy and 
structures. The sedimentary rock layers are relatively undeformed and 
unobscuredby vegetation, offering a clear view to understanding the proc-
esses of the earth's formation. A wide variety of formations, some in brilliant 
colors, have been exposed by millennia of erosion. The monument contains 
significant portions of a vast geologic stairway, named the Grand Staircase 
by pioneering geologist Clarence Dutton,< which rises 5,500 feet to the rim 
of Bryce Canyon in an unbroken sequence of great cliffs and plateaus. 
The monument includes the rugged canyon country of the upper Paria 
Canyon system, major components of the White and Vermilion Cliffs and 
associated benches, and the Kaiparowits Plateau. That Plateau encompasses 
about 1,600 square miles of sedimentary rock and consists of successive 
south-to-north ascending plateaus or benches, deeply cut by steep-walled 
canyons. Naturally burning coal seams have scorched the tops of the Burning 
Hills brick-red. Another prominent geological feature of the plateau is the 
East Kaitiab Monocline, known as the Cockscomb. The monument also in-
cludes the spectacular Circle Cliffs and part of the Waterpocket Fold, the 
inclusion of which completes the protection of this geologic feature begun 
with the establishment of Capitol Reef National Monument in 1938 (Procla-
mation No. 2246, 50 Stat. 1856). The monument holds many arches and 
natural bridges, including the 130-foot-high Escalante Natural Bridge, with 
a 100 foot span, and Grosvenor Arch; a rare "double arch." The upper 
Escalante Canyons, in the northeastern reaches of the monument, are distinc-
tive: in addition to several major arches and natural bridges, vivid geological 
features are laid bare in narrow, serpentine canyons, where erosion has 
exposed sandstone and shale deposits in shades of red, maroon, chocolate, 
tan, gray, and white. Such diverse objects make the monument outstanding 
for purposes of geologic study. 
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The monument includes world class paleontological sites. The Circle Cliffs 
reveal remarkable specimens of petrified wood, such as large unbroken 
logs exceeding 30 feet in length. The thickness, continuity and broad temporal 
distribution of the Kaiparowits Plateau's stratigraphy provide significant op-
portunities to study the paleontology of the late Cretaceous Era. Extremely 
significant fossils, including marine and brackish water mollusks, turtles, 
crocodilians, lizards, dinosaurs, fishes, and mammals, have been recovered 
from the Dakota, Tropic Shale and Wahweap Formations, and the Tibbet 
Canyon, Smoky Hollow and Joh& Henry members of the Straight Cliffs 
Formation. Within the monument, these formations have produced the only 
evidence in our hemisphere of terrestrial vertebrate fauna, including mam-
mals, of the Cenomanian-Santonian ages. This sequence of rocks, including 
the overlaying Wahweap and Kaiparowits formations, contains one of the 
best and most continuous records of Late Cretaceous terrestrial life in the 
world. 
Archeological inventories carried out to date show extensive use of places 
within the monument by ancient Native American cultures. The area was 
a contact point for the Anasazi and Fremont cultures, and the evidence 
of Jhis mingling provides a significant opportunity for archeological study. 
The cultural resources discovered so far in the monument are outstanding 
in their variety of cultural affiliation, type and distribution. Hundreds of 
recorded sites include rock art panels, occupation sites, campsites and gra-
naries. Many more undocumented sites that exist within the monument 
are of significant scientific and historic value worthy of preservation for 
future study. 
The monument is rich in human history. In addition to occupations by 
the Anasazi and Fremont cultures, the area has been used by modern tribal 
groups, including the Southern Paiute and Navajo. John Wesley Powell's 
expedition did initial mapping and scientific field work in the area in 
1872. Early Mormon pioneers left many historic objects, including trails, 
inscriptions, *ghost towns such as the Old Paria townsite, rock houses, and 
cowboy line damps, and built and traversed the renowned Hole~in-the-Rock 
Trail as part of their epic colonization efforts. Sixty miles of the Trail 
lie within the monument, as does Dance HallJtock, used by intrepid Mormon 
pioneers and now a National Historic Site. 
Spanning five life zones from low-lying desert to coniferous forest, with 
scarce and scattered water source^, the monument is an outstanding biological 
resource. Remoteness, liinited travel corridors and low visitation have all 
helped to preserve intact the monument's important ecological values. The 
blending of warm and cold desert floras, along with the high number of 
endemic species, place this area in the heart of perhaps the richest fioristic 
region in the Intermountain West It contains an abundance of unique, 
isolated communities such as hanging gardens, tinajas, and rock crevice, 
canyon bottom, and dunal pocket communities, which have provided refugia 
for many ancient plant species for millennia. Geologic uplift with minimal 
deformation and subsequent downcutting by streams have exposed large 
expanses of a variety of geologic strata, each with unioue physical and 
chemical characteristics. These strata are the parent material for a spectacular 
arrayof unusual and diverse soils that support many different vegetative 
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communities and numerous types of endemic plants and their pollinators. 
This presents an extraordinary opportunity to study plant speciation and 
community dynamics independent of climatic variables. The monument con-
tains an extraordinary number of areas of relict vegetation, many of which 
have existed since the Pleistocene, where natural processes continue 
unaltered by man. These include relict grasslands, of which No Mans Mesa 
is an outstanding example, and pinon-juniper communities containing trees 
up to 1,400 years old. As witnesses to the past, these relict areas establish 
a baseline against which to measure changes in community dynamics and 
bioseochemical cycles in areas impacted by human activity. Most of the 
ecological communities contained in the monument have low resistance 
to, and slow recovery from, disturbance. Fragile cryptobiotic crusts, them-
selves of significant biological interest, play a critical role throughout the 
monument, stabilizing the highly erodible desert soils and providing nutrients 
to plants. An abundance of packrat middens provides insight into the vegeta-
tion and climate of the past 25,000 years and furnishes context for studies 
of evolution and climate change. The wildlife of the monument is character-
ized by a diversity of species. The monument varies greatly in elevation 
and topography and is in a climatic zone where northern and southern 
habitat species intermingle. Mountain lion, bear, and desert bighorn sheep 
roam the monument. Over, 200 species of birds, including bald eagles and 
peregrine falcons, are found within the area. Wildlife, including neotropical 
birds, concentrate around the Paria and Escalante Rivers and other riparian 
corridors within the monument 
Section 2 of the Act of June 8, 1906 (34 Stat. 225, 16 U.S.C. 431) authorizes 
the President, in his discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic 
landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic 
or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled 
by the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and 
to reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all 
cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper 
care and management of the objects to be protected. 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States 
of America, by the authority vested in me by section 2 of the Act of 
June 8, 1906 (34 Stat. 225, 16 U.S.C. 431), do proclaim that there are 
hereby set apart and reserved as the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument, for the purpose 6f protecting the objects identified above, all 
lands and interests in lands owned or controlled by the United States 
within the boundaries of the area described on the document entitled "Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument" attached to and forming a part 
of this proclamation. The Federal land and interests in land reserved consist 
of approximately 1.7 million acres, which is the smallest area compatible 
with tne proper care and management of the objects to be protected. 
All Federal lands and interests in lands within the boundaries of this monu-
ment are hereby appropriated and withdrawn from entry, location, selection, 
sale, leasing, or other disposition under the public land laws, other than 
by exchange that furthers the protective purposes of the monument. Lands 
and interests in lands not owned by the United States shall be reserved 
as a part of the monument upon acquisition of title thereto by the United 
States. 
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The establishment of this monument is subject to valid existing rights. 
Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to diminish the responsibility 
and authority of the State of Utah for management of fish and wildlife, 
including regulation of hunting and fishing, on Federal lands within the 
monument. 
Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to affect existing permits 
or leases for, or levels of, livestock grazing on Federal lands within the 
monument; existing grazing uses shall continue to be governed ty applicable 
laws and regulations other than this proclamation. 
Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to revoke any existing with* 
drawal, reservation, or appropriation; however, the national monument shall 
be the dominant reservation. 
The Secretary of the Interior shall manage the monument through the Bureau 
of Land Management, pursuant to applicable legal authorities, to implement 
the purposes of this proclamation. The Secretary of the Interior shall prepare, 
within 3 years of this date, a management plan for this monument, and 
shall promulgate such regulations for its management as he deems appro-
priate. This proclamation does not reserve water as a matter of Federal' 
law. I direct the Secretary to address in the management plan the extent 
to which water is necessary for the proper care and management of the 
objects of this monument and the extent to which further action may be 
necessary pursuant to Federal or State law to assure the availability C*t 
water. 
Warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate/ 
injure, destroy, or remove any feature of this monument and not to locate 
or settle upon any of the lands thereof. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eighteenth da^ 
of September, in the year of our Jx>rd nineteen hundred and ninety-sis^ 
and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred 
and twenty-first
 f 
tFR Doc. •6-24*16 
Fited »-2*46; 12:27 ptnl 
Billing codt 3195-01-1* 
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CONCESSION CONTRACT 
UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 
—0000O0000— 
Del Webb Recreational Properties, Inc. 
Glen Canyon National Recreational Area 
—0000O0000— 
CONTRACT NUMBER CC-GLCA002-88 EXECUTED December 8, 1988, 
COVERING THE PERIOD 
January 1, 1988 Through December 31* 2007 
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THIS CONTRACT made and entered into by and between the United States 
of America, acting in this matter by the Secretary of the Interior, through 
the Director of the National Park Service, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Secretary," and Del Webb Recreational Properties, Inc., a corporation 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Arizona, doing 
business as Bullfrog Marina, Incorporated, Halls Crossing Resort and 
Marina, Incorporated, and Hite Resort and Marina, Incorporated, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Concessioner": 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
THAT WHEREAS, Glen Canyon National Recreation Area (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Area") is administered by the Secretary to provide for 
public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of Lake Powell and adjacent 
lands and to preserve the scenic, scientific, and historic features 
contributing to that enjoyment; and 
WHEREAS, the accomplishment of these purposes requires that facilities 
and services be provided for the public visiting the area and that all 
private interest shall be excluded except so far as may be necessary for 
the accomplishment of said purposes, including accommodation of the public; 
and 
WHEREAS, the United States has not itself provided such necessary 
facilities and services and desires the Concessioner to establish and 
operate the same at reasonable rates under the supervision and regulation 
of the Secretary; and 
WHEREAS, the establishment and maintenance of such facilities and 
services involves a substantial investment of capital and the assumption of 
the risk of operating loss, it is therefore proper, in consideration of the 
obligations assumed hereunder and as an inducement to capital, that the 
Concessioner be given assurance of security of such investment and of a 
reasonable opportunity to make a profit; and 
WHEREAS, pursuant to law the Secretary is required to exercise his 
authority hereunder in a manner consistent, with a reasonable opportunity by 
the Concessioner to realize a profit on the operations conducted hereunder 
as a whole commensurate with the capital invested and the obligations 
assumed: 
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the authority contained in the Acts of 
August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1, 2-4), and October 9, 1965 (79 
Stat. 969; 16 U.S.C. 20), and other laws supplemental thereto and 
amendatory thereof, the said parties agree as follows: 
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SEC, 1. TERM OF CONTRACT, (a) This contract shall supersede and 
cancel Contracts No. NPS-WASO-IX-66-2 for Bullfrog Marina, Inc., 9900C20106 
for Halls Crossing Resort & Marina, Inc., and CC 1440-2-0001 for Hite 
Resort L Marina, Inc.,effective upon the close of business December 31, 
1987. and shall be for the term of twenty (20) years from January 1, 1988 
through December 31, 2007. 
(b) The Concessioner shall undertake and complete an improvement 
and building program costing not less than $30,000,000 as adjusted per 
project to reflect par value in the year of actual construction in 
accordance with the appropriate indexes of the Department of Commerce's 
"Construction Review". 
It is agreed that such investment is consistent with Section 4(a) hereof. 
The Concessioner is authorized to undertake a development program as 
generally described in the Bullfrog Development Concept Plan, the Halls 
Crossing Development Concept Plan, and the Hite Development Concept Plan. 
The Concessioner shall implement the development program in accordance with 
the Phased Development Schedule set forth in Exhibit "A" to this contract. 
(c) The Concessioner shall start the improvement and building 
program when directed by the Secretary in such a manner as to demonstrate 
to the satisfaction of the Secretary that it is in good faith carrying said 
program forward reasonably under the circumstances. After approved of 
plans and specifications, the Concessioner shall provide the Secretary with 
such evidence or documentation, as may be satisfactory to the Secretary, to 
demonstrate that such program is being carried forward, and shall complete 
and have it available for public use in accordance with the Phased 
Development Schedule, Exhibit "A". 
(d) The Concessioner maiy, in the discretion of the Secretary, be 
relieved in whole or in part of any or all of the obligations of the 
improvement program for such stated periods as the Secretary may deem 
proper upon written application by the Concessioner showing circumstances 
beyond its control warranting such relief. 
SEC. 2. ACCOMMODATIONS. FACILITIES AND SERVICES, (a) The Secretary 
requires and hereby authorizes the Concessioner during the term of this 
contract to provide the following accommodations, facilities, and services 
for the public within Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. The 
Concessioner shall hold a preferential right to these services pursuant to 
Section 2(d). 
BULLFROG BASIN: 
- Overnight Lodging Accommodations up to 150 lodge units and 30 
housekeeping units. 
- Food and Beverage"Service. 
- Boat Slip Rentals up to 400 berths. 
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- Mooring Buoy Rentals up to 210 buoys. 
- Dry Boat Storage up to 1000 units including boat launch and 
retrieval. 
- Boat Repair Facilities. 
- Boat Repair Yard for use by the public. 
- Houseboat Rentals up to 150 houseboats. 
- Small Boat Rentals (less than 26 ft) for up to 150 boats. 
- Interpretive and Scenic Boat Tours. 
- Automobile Service Station including vehicle repair services and 
automobile towing originating and terminating within the area of 
preferential right. 
- Recreational Vehicle Campground with utility hookups up to 150 sites. 
- Public Laundry and Shower Facility. 
- Grocery, Gift, and Merchandise Sales. 
- Boat Accessory and Parts Sales. 
- Marina Fuel Facilities. 
- Boat Towing and Chase Boats. 
- Overnight Boat Charters. 
I 
- Public Campgrounds under such conditions as may be prescribed by the 
Secretary. 
- Land Transportation and Shuttle Services originating and terminating 
within the area of preferential right. 
HALLS CROSSING: 
- Automobile and Passenger Ferry Service between Halls Crossing and 
Bullfrog Basin. 
- Overnight Lodging Accommodations up to 150 lodging units and 20 
housekeeping units. 
- Food and Beverage;Service. 
- Boat Slip Rentals up to 2^0 berths• 
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- Mooring Buoy Rentals up to 150 buoys. 
- Dry Boat Storage up to 1000 units including boat launch and retrieval. 
- Boat Repair Facilities. 
- Boat Repair Yard for use by the public. 
- Houseboat Rentals up to 140 houseboats. 
- Small Boat Rentals (less than 26 ft) for up to 140 boats. 
- Interpretive and Scenic Boat Tours. 
- Automobile Service Station including vehicle repair services and 
automobile towing originating and terminating within the area of 
preferential right. 
- Recreational Vehicle Campground with utility hookups up to 150 
sites. 
- Public Laundry and Shower Facilities. 
- Grocery, Gift, and Merchandise Sales. 
- Boat Accessory and Parts Sales. 
- Marina Fuel Facilities. 
- Boat Towing and Chase Boats. 
- Overnight Boat Charters. 
- Public Campgrounds under such conditions as may be prescribed by the 
Secretary. 
- Land Transportation and Shuttle services originating and terminating 
within the area of preferential right. 
HITE: 
- Overnight Lodging Accommodations up to 15 housekeeping units. 
- Food and Beverage Service in the manner of a snack bar. 
- Boat Slip Rentals up to 40 berths. 
- Mooring Buoy Rentals up to 5^ buoys. 
- Dry Boat Storage up to 160 units including boat launch and 
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retrieval, 
- Boat Repair Facilities. 
- Boat Repair Yard for use by the public. 
- Houseboat Rentals up to 40 houseboats. 
- Small Boat Rentals (less than 26 ft) for up to 40 boats. 
- Interpretive and Scenic Boat Tours. 
- Automobile Service Station. 
- Recreational Vehicle Campground with utility hookups up to 25 
sites. 
- Public Laundry and Shower Facility. 
- Grocery, Gift, and Merchandise Sales. 
- Boat Accessory and Parts Sales. 
- Marina Fuel Facilities. 
- Boat Towing and Chase Boat. 
- Overnight Boat Charters. 
- River Runner Pickup Service except that N.P.S permitted commercial river 
runner outfitters may provide their own pickup service. 
- Land Transportation and Shuttle services originating and terminating 
within the area of preferential right. 
The Concessioner may provide services incidental to the operations 
authorized above at the request of the Secretary. 
(b) The Secretary further authorizes, but does not require, the 
following accommodations, facilities, and services. The Concessioner will 
not hold a preferential right to these services pursuant to Section 2(d): 
BULLFROG: 
- Incidental Boat Repair not requiring facilities, including hull and 
structural repair if performed in an authorized location. 
- Boat Launch and Retrieval originating or terminating outside the area of 
preferential right. 
- Marine Salvage outside the designated anchorage area. 
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Fishing Guide Services. 
- Boat Cleaning and Caretaking Services for boats in authorized storage 
facilities, including painting, waxing, and other "detail" work. 
- Boat Sewage Pumpout Stations. 
HALLS CROSSING: 
- Incidental Boat Repair not requiring facilities including hull and 
structural repair if performed in an authorized location. 
- Boat Launch and Retrieval originating or terminating outside the area of 
preferential right. 
- Marine Salvage outside the designated anchorage area. 
- Fishing Guide Services. 
- Boat Cleaning and Caretaking Services for boats in authorized storage 
facilities, including painting, waxing, and other "detail" work. 
- Boat Sewage Pumpout Stations. 
HITE: 
- Incidental Boat Repair not requiring facilities including hull and 
structural repair if performed in an authorized location. 
- Boat Launch and Retrieval originating or terminating outside the area of 
preferential right. 
- Marine Salvage outside the designated anchorage area. 
- Fishing Guide Services. 
- Boat Cleaning and Caretaking Services for boats in authorized storage 
facilities, including painting, waxing, and other "detail" work. 
- Boat Sewage Pumpout Stations. 
(c) The Secretary reserves the right to determine and control the 
nature, type and quality of the merchandise and services described herein 
as authorized and required to be sold or furnished by the Concessioner 
within the Area. Operations under this contract and the administration 
thereof by the Secretary shall be subject to the laws of Congress governing 
the Area and the rules, regulations, and policies promulgated thereunder, 
whether now in fdrcfe or hereafter enacted or promulgated, including but not 
limited to the United States Public Health Service requirements. 
Concessioners must also comply with current applicable criteria promulgated 
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